House Resolution N

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May 27. Secretary of State Hull recommended revision of neutrality law to eliminate arms embargo. ("If we go in for embargoes on exports, for the purpose of keeping ourselves out of war, the logical thing to do would be to make our embargo all inclusive. Modern warfare is no longer warfare between armed forces only: it is warfare between nations in every phase of their national life. Lists of contraband are no longer limited to arms and ammunition and closely related commodities. They include not only those items which contribute toward making warfare possible, but almost every item useful in the life of the enemy nation. A nation at war is no less anxious to keep cotton or petroleum or, indeed, any useful product, from reaching an enemy nation than it is to keep guns and airplanes from reaching the enemy's armed forces. I doubt whether we can help ourselves to keep out of war by an attempt on our part to distinguish between categories of exports. Yet a complete embargo upon all exports would obviously be ruinous to our economic life. It therefore seems clear that we should have no general and automatic embargo inflexibly and rigidly imposed on any class or group of exports." State Release 1939, No. 505, p. 476. Cf. Peace, p.463.)
May 28. Ambassador Henderson told Field Marshal Hermann Goering Britain was determined to resist by force any new aggression: (As a result of the Prague coup; "I thought it more important . . . to understand the British point of view in consequence of it. British, No. 12, p. 26. Cf. May 15, supra.)
May 31. Germany and Denmark signed ten year nonaggression treaty (". . . earnestly desirous of maintaining peace between Germany and Denmark under all circumstances . . ." German, No. 345, p. 365. Cf. Apr. 28, supra.)

Foreign Commissar Molotov stated terms for defensive alliance with Britain: an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression, a guarantee against aggression to be given to the states of Central and Eastern Europe "including all European countries bordering on the U. S. S. R., without exception," and a concrete military agreement to be concluded by the U. S. S. R., Great Britain, and France. (A desire for absolute equality and complete reciprocity. Lee, p. 397. Cf. May. 19, supra.)

June 1. Chancellor, Hitler promised German friendship for Yugo­slavia. (". . . as firmly established relations of mutual confi­dence between Germany and Yugoslavia (since historic events have made us neighbors with common frontiers fixed forever) will serve not only to ensure permanent peace between our two peoples and countries, but over and above that will constitute a factor of pacification for our sorely troubled continent." German, No. 340, p. 362. Cf. Apr. 28, supra.)


June 3. Arthur K. Greiser, president of the Danzig Senate, protested increase in Polish customs officials. (". . . the ever increasing number of Polish Customs Inspectors was not compatible with the execution of their prescribed duties." British, No. 26, p. 87. Cf. Mar. 28, supra.)
June 6. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles said a constructive peace policy for the United States included armament for self-­defense and assistance to South America; revision of neutrality laws so as not to encourage or assist aggressors; and to cooperate constructively for disarmament and equality of economic oppor­tunity. ("We cannot escape the fact that our nation is an integral part of a world closely knit together by the developments of modern science and invention. We cannot deny the self evident truth that the outbreak of a general war in any part of the world will inevitably have grave repercussions upon our national economy, and upon our social well being, and not im­probably upon our national security itself." State Release 1939, No. 506, p. 489. Cf. May 27, supra.)
June 7. Prime Minister Chamberlain said new France British Russian military alliance would include cases where a Government "might feel that its security was indirectly menaced by the action of another European Power." ("It is not intended that the full military support which the three Powers will agree to extend should be confined to cases of actual aggression on their own territory." Commons, Vol. 348, col. 400. Cf. May 31, supra.)

Germany signed nonaggression agreements with Esthonia and Latvia. (". . . earnestly desirous of maintaining peace between Germany and Esthonia under all circumstances, . . ." German, No. 346, p. 367; for Latvia, Ibid., No. 347, p. 368. Cf. April 28, supra.)

June 10. Polish Government rejected Danzig Senate protest and proposal of June 3. ("Essence of whole question is that territory of Free City is part of Polish Customs Territory, both legally and in virtue of treaty obligations." British, No. 27, p. 90.)
June 11. Léon Noel, French Ambassador in Warsaw, reported influx of S. A. men and German army motor cars and motor cycles in Danzig. (". . . it is only a question of a simple military tourna­ment amongst the S. A., `in which units of the standing Army are taking part'. . . . The intention of the German leaders to `nibble' at the statute of Danzig is none the less evidenced anew by these facts." French, No. 134, pp. 157 f. Cf. June 3, supra.)
June 13. Ambassador Henderson sought some way with Germany to get through the summer without war. ("As long as London was carrying on negotiations with Moscow, conversations between London and Berlin were naturally impossible; if the pact with Russia were concluded, however, it might be easier to talk with Berlin. . . . The substance of a talk between the British and German Governments might be how to put an end to the arma­ments race and revive economic exchange. The colonial question could also be discussed." German, No. 307, p. 329. Cf. May 28, supra.)
June 14. Japan blockaded British and French concessions, mistreated British, and interfered with their shipping at Tientsin. (Four Chinese, who allegedly killed a Japanese customs officer, took refuge there. Simonds, Emeny, p. 690; Lee, p. 398.)
June 16. Lord Halifax reported that Herbert von Dirksen, German Ambassador, said Germany resented British regrouping of powers, because it was designed to operate coercive pressure on Germany. (". . . much of the feeling at the present time was due to all the discussion about our anti aggression negotiations with Russia." British, No. 23, p., 70., Cf., Apr. 28, supra.)
June 17. German State Secretary Weizsäcker warned French Ambas­sador Robert Coulondre that it was futile to threaten the Ger­mans with the Russians. ("The method of intimidation pro­duced in us the opposite of what was intended." German, No. 308, p. 330. Cf. June 7, supra.)
June 20. Ambassador Coulondre reported to the French Foreign Office that Germany would take Danzig and start a European war within two or three months. (". . . in Herr Hitler's eyes the affair is not yet ripe. He wishes to await, before acting, the develop­ment in one way or the other, of the Angle France Russian nego­tiations [for in Berlin there is still the hope that these negotiations may break down]. He also wants to await the evolution of the Anglo Japanese conflict. . . . But the Nazi authorities will ex­haust all means of turning the position before contemplating a frontal attack, . . ." French, No. 138, pp. 162 f. Cf. May 25, June 11, supra.)
June 22. Ambassador Coulondre reported that Danzig was not an end in itself for Hitler. (Field Marshal Hermann Goering said "Germany intends to take back all the territory which has belonged to her in the course of history." French, No. 143, p. 166.)
June 23. Britain denied she would always be hostile to Germany in every war. ("Great Britain could only be hostile to Germany if Germany were to commit an act of aggression against another country; and the political decision, to which it is understood the German Government refer in their memorandum involving guar­antees by Great Britain to certain countries, could only operate if the countries concerned wore to be attacked by Germany. . . . The consistent desire of His Majesty's Government, far from being the promotion of a war with Germany, has been and is to establish Anglo German relations on the basis of the. mutual recognition of the needs of both countries, consistently with due regard for the rights of other nations." British, No. 23, pp. 71 f. Cf. Apr. 28, supra.).

France and Turkey signed a defensive alliance and an agree­ment ceding the Hatay Republic [Sanjak of Alexandretta] to Turkey. (". . . to establish peace and a feeling of security in the Near East and the Balkans." Times, June 24, 1939, p. 4.)

American-British cotton rubber agreement concluded. (". . . to acquire reserves of cotton and rubber, respectively, against


the contingency of a major war emergency, . . . This Agree­ment shall come into force on a date to be agreed between the two governments." State Release 1939, No. 508, pp. 548 f. Cf. Peace, p. 63.)
June 27. Ambassador Coulondre reported signs of approaching crisis: 600,000 German reservists called up, large scale Italian troop maneuvers planned for August, and mobilization of two classes in Bulgaria; advice to foreign families to leave Germany before August; time limit on validity of German male passports; Aug. 15 "der tag" for the Reichswehr. (". . . in order to avoid any misunderstanding on this subject, one may ask whether it is not high time to speak plainly and frustrate this possible manoeuvre by dispelling any illusions which may still be held in Berlin." French, No. 145, p. 169. Cf. similar reports to Britain from Danzig. British, No. 29, p. 92; No. 31, pp. 94 f. Cf. June 20, supra.)
June 29. Lord Halifax warned that Britain was determined to resist aggression. (`. . . we are now engaged with the Soviet Govern­ment in a negotiation, to which I hope there may very shortly be a successful issue, with a view to associating them with us for the defence of States in Europe whose independence and neutrality may be threatened. We have assumed obligations, and are pre­paring to assume more, with full understanding of their causes and with full understanding of their consequences. We know that, if the security and independence of other countries are to disappear, our own security and our own independence will be gravely threatened. We know that, if international law and order is to be preserved, we must be prepared to fight in its defence.

"In the past we have always stood out against the attempt by any single Power to dominate Europe at the expense of the liber­ties of other nations; and British policy is, therefore, only follow­ing the inevitable line of its own history, if such an attempt were to be made again." (British, No. 25, p. 78; Cf. also German No. 312, p. 334) and added that instead of encirclement Germany was isolating herself successfully and completely. (". . . eco­nomically by her policy of autarchy, politically by a policy that causes constant anxiety to other nations, and culturally by her policy of racialism. If you deliberately isolate yourself from others by your own actions, you can blame nobody but yourself; and so long as this isolation continues, the inevitable consequences of it, are bound to become stronger and more marked. The last thing we desire is to see the individual German man, or woman, or child suffering privations; but if they do so, the fault does not lie with us; and it depends on Germany and Germany alone whether this process of isolation continues or not, for any day it can be ended by a policy of co operation. It is well that this should be stated plainly so that there may be no misunderstanding here or elsewhere." British, p. 81.)

June 30. Ambassador Coulondre told Germany that France would not be bound in case of Polish provocation. (Secretary Weizsäcker said ". . . we were not on the eve of a tremendous eruption, unless it were provoked by Polish excesses. That would cer­tainly mean finis Poloniae." German, No. 314, p. 336. Cf. Mar. 31, supra.)

Lord Halifax said the time had come for Britain, France, and Poland to consult to coordinate their plans. ("It would seem that Hitler is laying his plans very astutely so as to present the Polish Government with a fait accompli in Danzig, to which it would be difficult for them to react without appearing in the role of aggressors. . . . It is in the view of His Majesty's Government essential that . . . plans shall be so devised as to ensure that Hitler shall not be able so to manage matters as to manoeuvre the Polish Government into the position of aggres­sors." British, No. 30, pp. 93 f. Cf. June 27, 29, supra.)

July 1. Secretary of State Hull expressed regret over the failure of Congress to revise the neutrality law after his recommendation of May 27, supra. ("Its failure to pass the House by a narrow margin is a matter of regret and disappointment from the stand­point of peace and the best interests of this country in its inter­national relations. This six point peace and neutrality proposal is not only best calculated to keep this Nation out of war in the event war comes, but also, what is all important at this time, best calculated to make a far greater contribution than could the present law or its equivalent toward the discouragement of the outbreak of war. At the same time, while doing this, it would like wise keep this Government and Nation 100 percent within the limits of universally recognized international law." Bulletin Vol. I, No. 1, p. 4. Cf. Peace, p. 465.)

Poland refused to be provoked by influx of "tourists" into Danzig. (". . . the Polish Government were determined not to be scared by any psychological terrorism into imprudent action . . . a war was not won by a few thousand `tourists.' The Germans knew that quite well and were mainly hoping to provoke and intimidate Poland." British, No. 32, p. 96.) Further report on military preparations in Danzig. (Ibid., No. 33, pp. 96 f; cf. July 3, Ibid., No. 34, 97: ". . . the process is intended to facilitate a coup by Herr Hitler should he decide on one." Cf. June 11, supra.)

July 4. French Consul General in Hamburg reported likely German­-Russian five year nonaggression pact. (". . . if some agree­ment is not shortly concluded between London, Paris, and Moscow, the Soviet Government will be prepared to sign a pact of non aggression with the Reich for a period of five years. For some time past there has been anxiety in those circles about the rapid evolution of the National Socialist system in the direction of autarchy and collectivization. People do not disguise their fear of seeing this tendency still further strengthened by political cooperation between Berlin and Moscow." French, No. 155, p. 180. Cf. May 3, 7, 22, supra.)


July 8. Germany and Italy agreed on repatriation of Germans south of Tyrol who did not wish to become Italianized. (Chancellor Hitler renounced his designs on that region. Lee, p. 392; Simonds, Emeny, p. 690. Cf. May 22, supra.)
July 9. Ambassador Leon Noel warned the French Foreign Office that Germany wanted the Corridor and other territories that were detached from the Reich. ("The language used by those Germans who live in Poland, or who come here on a visit and even that which one may hear from the lips of certain close friends of Herr von Moltke, clearly confirm it; and while, of course, my German colleague personally shows himself much more prudent, nobody has ever heard him, say that the annexation of Danzig was the last of the Nazi claims." French, No. 159, p. 182. Cf. Ibid., No. 184, p. 221. Cf. June 20, 22., supra.)
July 10. Ambassador Kensuke Horinouchi told Secretary of State Hull Japan had no idea of entering a military pact with Germany and Italy. (Cf. Dec. 4, 1936, supra. ". . . there had been re­ports in this country. . ." Peace, p. 467)

Ambassador von Dirksen reported that British public opinion thought war inevitable and had taken the initiative from the government. ("The feeling is gaining ground among the people that they must not put up with anything further, that their honor is at stake, that they would have to fight, and that the Govern­ment must not, give in again. . . However unfounded and dangerous this attitude of the British public may be, it is real and must be taken seriously, all the more so in a country in which public opinion plays such a decisive role as it does in England." German, No. 252, p. 211. Cf. May 15, supra.)

Prime Minister Chamberlain repeated guarantee of help to Poland in threat to her independence she must resist. (Cf. Mar. 31, supra. "Recent occurrences in Danzig have inevitably given rise to fears that it is intended to settle her future status by unilateral action, organised by surreptitious methods, thus pre­senting Poland and other Powers with a fait accompli. In such circumstances any action taken by Poland to restore the situation would, it is suggested, be represented as an act of aggression on her part; and if her action were supported by other Powers, they would be accused of aiding and abetting her in the use of force.

"If the sequence of events should, in fact, be such as is contemplated on this hypothesis, hon. Members will realise, from what I have said earlier, that the issue could not be considered as a purely local matter involving the rights and liberties of the Danzigers, which incidentally are in no way threatened, but would at once raise graver issues affecting Polish national existence and independence. We have guaranteed to give our assistance to Poland in the case of a clear threat to her independence, which she considers it vital to resist with her national forces, and we are firmly resolved to carry out this undertaking." Commons, Vol. 349, col. 1788.)

July l1. Secretary of State Hull again urged revision of the neutrality law. (Cf. July 1, supra. ". . . the interests of peace and the security of the United States require that we should continue to urge the adoption of the principles of the six point program." Bulletin; Vol. I, No. 3, p. 47.)
July 13. Von Ribbentrop wrote M. Bonnet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Germany must reject "once for all and categorically" any interference of France in its spheres of vital interest ("Germany's relations with its Eastern neighbours, whatever form they assume, in no way affect French interests; they are a matter which only concerns German policy." French, No. 163, p. 190); warned any Polish, violation of Danzig soil or provocation "incompatible with the prestige, of the German Reich," would be met by immediate German march and "the total destruction of the Polish army." (Ibid., p. 191.) If France intended to attack Germany for refusing to tolerate violence to its interests by Polish armed opposition to any change from the status quo in Danzig, Germany would accept war. (". . . such threats could only further strengthen the Führer in his resolve to ensure the safeguarding of German interests by all the means at his disposal." Ibid., p. 191. Cf. June 30, supra.)

Ambassador Coulondre reported increasing war preparations pointing to eventuality in August. ("The German General Staff is acting as though it had to be ready by a date which has been set for it, and this date, according to all appearances, will fall in the course of the month of August, at which period the harvest will he gathered, the fortifications will be ready, and the reservists will be assembled in large numbers in the camps." French, No. 164, p. 193. Cf. June 27, supra.)

July 14. Ambassador Henderson reiterated Prime Minister Chamber­lain's guarantee to Poland of July 10. (". . . Sir Edward Grey had been guilty of screening himself and the British Government behind a cloud of fog. The present British Government wished to avoid incurring such a reproach." German, No. 440, p. 447 f. Cf. British, No. 36, pp. 101 f.)

President Roosevelt asked repeal of arms embargo. ("Peace is so precious and war so devastating that the people of the United States and their Government must not fail to make their just and legitimate contribution to the preservation of peace. . . . The proponents, including the Executive branch of the Govern­ment, at the time when the arms embargo was originally adopted called attention to the fact that its enactment constituted a hazardous departure from the principle of international law which recognizes the right of neutrals to trade with belligerents and of belligerents to trade with neutrals. They believe that neutrality means impartiality, and in their view an arms embargo is directly opposed to the idea of neutrality. It is not humanly possible, by enacting an arms embargo, or by refraining from such enactment, to hold the scales exactly even between two belligerents. In either case and due to shifting circumstances one belligerent may find itself in a position of relative advantage or disadvantage. The important difference between the two

cases is that when such a condition arises in the absence of an arms embargo on our part, no responsibility attaches to this country, whereas in the presence of an embargo, the responsibility of this country for the creation of the condition is inevitably direct and clear." Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 43 f. Cf. Peace, pp. 468 f. Cf. July 1, 11, supra.)
July 17. Marshal Smigly-Rydz said Poland would fight even without allies if Germany took Danzig. ("Danzig is necessary for Poland. Who controls Danzig controls our economic life.") (German Ambassador von Moltke wrote: "The emphatic reiteration of the fact that Poland would, if necessary, resort to arms on account of Danzig, even without allies, is designed to discourage the theory, so injurious to Polish self esteem, that Poland's readiness to de­fend herself was merely the outcome of the British guarantee, and at the same time to make clear to the friendly Powers that there were definite limits to Poland's readiness to negotiate." German, No. 441, pp. 448 f. Cf. June 11, supra.
July 18. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull again urged Congress to act on neutrality revision. (". . . failure by the Senate to take action now would weaken the leadership of the United States in exercising its potent influence in the cause of preserving peace among other nations in the event of a new crisis in Europe between now and next January." Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 4; p. 57. Cf. Peace, p. 474. Cf. July 1, 11, 14, supra.)

Danzig Senate offered to settle questions with Poland through the intervention of the High Commissioner. ("This would . . . terminate a war of notes which only poisons the situation, . . ." British., No. 37, pp. 103 f. Cf. June 3, 10, supra.)

July 21. Lord Halifax urged discretion and cooperation on part of Poland to meet Danzigers. ("I am most anxious that this ten­tative move from German side should not be compromised by publicity or by any disinclination on part of Polish Government to discuss in friendly and reasonable spirit any concrete question which may be taken up by Senate through High Commissioner. . . . It is nevertheless essential not to destroy possibility of better atmosphere at outset, and I trust that more care than ever will be taken on Polish side to avoid provocation in any sphere and to restrain press." Ibid., No. 38, p. 105.)
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