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D.S. All our approaches have produced same re-action.


Hail. Wd it help if U.K. Minister were in attendance?
P.M. No-one went to India & Pakistan. We don’t distinguish betwn.

republican and monarchical parts of C’wealth.


D.S. Shd be sorry to establish this precedent.
Hail. Wd be some re-assurance to opinion here.
D.S. Doesn’t out-weigh political disadvantages.
P.M. x/ Might take a more senior staff – e.g. Scarboro’. I will consider.
Approved. Formal submission. P.M. to consider x/.
D.S. White Paper – on strike at Tacoradi: relations with U.K: may

be pretext for w’drawal.


I.M. Disastrous reflection on Queen, if it occurred.
S.Ll. N. was frank in disclosing republican intentions before Queen’s

first visit.


H. Criticism of H. Commr. office wd. be more serious.
P.M. Mght. remind N. of his earlier disclosure of republican intentions.

Heard rumours of w’drawal. Can I have your re-assurance

on this. Any immediate intention of any constitutional change?

5. Commercial Policy: Japan.


F.E. Memo. submd with endorsement of E.P. Cttee.
P.T. Memo meets all points raised in E.P.C.
Memo. approved.

C.C. 60(61). 8th November, 1961.
Ghana: Queen’s Visit. [Enter M.R.
P.M. Gratitude (of Cab.) to D.S. for undertaking visit at short notice.

Also trial run & public appearance of Nk., wh. only a

Minister cd. have done. V. good effect on public opinion

here.
D.S. Nec. to demonstrate to U.K. public tht. we were taking explosions

as serious new development.

Two tasks i) 2nd review of security position. Nk., M/Interior,

Ch. Police. Our N.S.Yd repves: Jones & Fergusson-Smith.,

M.I.5. liaison offr. Jacks., McCabe ex-chief of Sp. Branch,

now its adviser. With one exception (M.I.5) all considered

explosions involved no addl risk; & M.I.5 repve later changed

his mind on this. Purpose (my view) to secure cancelln of

visit thus humiliate Nk. [M.I.5. thesis tht. because source

of new development unknown it is new factor: & might

encourage others to have a bash.] Precautions: N.S.Yd

satisfied with character, scale & efficiency.

Our Press attitude has caused grief, as well as annoyance –

havg. regard to enormous expense incurred by Ghana. Have

lectured them on this, locally.

ii) Practical demonstration that Nk. can show his face in

public – after notice. Proved tht. vast majority are keenly in

favour of Nk.

Advise we adhere to our decision: no additional risk.

iii) Rumour of w’drawal from C’wealth – as in para. 4 of

Accra. No. 63. Decorations etc., on C’wealth model: emphasis

on Queen as Head of C’wealth.

W. Paper. Assurances from Nk. tht. it will contain no

serious allegns v. Br. - & promise to let me see it in advance.
R.A.B. My informn corroborates D.S. report. N.S.Yd only anxiety is over

ex-Ghana Ministers now in Togoland.

No doubt tht. row shd. go fwd.
K. Agree.
Hail. Strongly of opinion we shd. not advise any change of plan.
J.M. Gbedemah
D.S. Disappeared. Thought to be in Lagos or U.S.
H. D.S. journey carries conviction. Wd be almost imposs. for H.M. to

remain Head of C’wealth if she w’drew from this.


P.M. Tho’ risk is not more than usual, people don’t realise how great the

normal risk is.

Tho’ no greater for her, much greater for us – in view of public

anxiety which has now been raised.

Parly opinion. Looked y’day as tho’ we mght. have back-bench

revolt (60-80) which, if exploited by Labour, might result in a

defeat. Wd be v. awkward: I cdn’t reverse my advice; she wd.

appear to have flouted Parlt. Press last p.m. and this a.m. may

have improved situation.
D.S. Bad effect in Ghana of any H/C. debate.
I.M. Y’day no doubt tht. adjournment wd. have bn. demanded, and

many wd. have voted v. us. “Going to a place where there

is some danger and with which they have no sympathy.”
P.M. Saw J. Morrison:
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Not much impression.


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C.C. 61 (61) 9th November, 1960
1. Parliament. [Enter M.R.
I.M. Business for next week. And, in following week. 20/21 Nov. 2nd Rdg. of Transport Bill.
2. Government Expenditure: Administrative Savings.
H.B. Dpts. have with Ty agreed to minor savings totalling about £143/4m.
Subject to minor adjustments these are agreed figures.
Seek Cab. endorsement. Ministers to embody these in Estimates & draw those as tightly as possible.

Policy proposals – to follow later.

Not suitable for announcement as a whole. Some will need to be announced piecemeal: will discuss timing with Ministers concerned and I.M.

Society: magnis successor is less amiable: he leaked infn gained in Whitley negotiations. Dpts. shd. be warned tht. Nunn is not reliable.


Agreed: N.B. to consider.
C.S. I shall have to announce p’ponment of swim-fiver campaign.

x? Shall I relate it to genl. campaign to compress Govt. expenditure.


H.B. Yes.
C.S. Then timing will be important: wd. want to go off with other things.
Hail. Research Councils. Savings are not minor in reln to their expenditure.
Effects on policy & politics will be large.
H. Para. 14 (2). On oversea expenditure we have saved 5% already: personnel cut abroad may have to be accommodated at home – and that will make it more difficult to economise in home expenditure.
Agreed: on reflection, better not to do x/. Announce each as
Dpl. affair.
3. O.E.C.D. Next Meeting.
S.L1. Letter from Ball (U.S.) indicatg. next mtg. will be propaganda tht. Western world will increase G.N.P. by 50% in 10 years. Actual over last 10 yrs. is not much above 3%. Future realistic estimate around 4%. Dangerous – targets not reached are represented as failure. So far, I have forecast not more than 3% for U.K.

Best course may be to choose longer period.


E.M. Awkward for wages policy.

No enthusiasm for high target. [Enter D.S.


4. Nubian Monuments.
D.E. £367m = cost of Dam. R. not asked to pay anything for this damage, nor have they contributed to Unesco fund.

Unesco have had only 39 replies: see para 2.: U.S. now likely to contribute only to “File”. 11 countries have declined – incldg. 4 C’wealth countries.

$15m p.a. = income of Unesco. This is our of scale with its proper work.
Also, any money available for Africa wd. be better spent on education.

Only reason for this is politics.


Hail. Will $72m be reached by due date? What value will be gained by money likely to be raised? What will they do?
D.E. They can’t save Abu Simbel with money likely to be raised. But lesser sum wd. be spent on other things. And in Sudan we cd. prob. do more.
H.B. How can we do this, when we are pressing for economics all round.
If we give £50.000 we shall be asked for more later.
Effect on Br. subjects damaged in Egypt?
H. Only reason for doing this is to improve relns with U.A.R.
D.E. If R. won’t contribute, why shd. we?
R.A.B. Para. 6 (b).
Agreed: no enthusiasm, but p’pone decision.
5. Commonwealth Immigration. [Enter P.M.
R.A.B. Impracticable to control Irish border. But we make statement proposed, Irish Republic will probably help to close their gap thro’ which W. Indians wd. pour. Tho’ they wd. have to legislate.
D.S. Asked for explanation in detail.
R.M. Amend statement to make it plain tht. this is solely due to practical considerations.
I.M. We can quote Chuter Ede, who had to make same defence of the Irish decision.
Ch. H. More emphasis on practical considerations.
K. This pass was sold in 1948. Reflects facts of history & geography.
British Isles are in fact a unit.
R.A.B. We cd. try to get a bargain with Eire – on basis tht. we had asked them to take this action & they had agreed – for announcement in 2nd Rdg. debate.

We cd. also bring out seasonal labour more clearly.


Agreed: subject to drafting changes.
6. Kenya: Kenyatta.
R.M. Tribal tensions rising & economy declining: risk of serious clash.
Best bit: conference early ’62 to devise safeguards for minorities.
All action m’while shd. make tht. more likely to succeed.

K. is now free in all respects save eligibility for Parlt. Govr. now want to remove this restn. Tho’ leader of major Party he is old man & in Parlt. may be shown up & cut down to size.

Fear of his being Ch. Minister. We cdn’t prevent that when K. independent or even respons. for internal self-govt.

On balance, believe this will be wiser course.


Hail. Effect on opinion re C’wealth. We were too good to associate with S. Africa. What about this? Will he be cut down to size?
Will he attend P.M.M. or advise Queen? If so, where is C’wealth going? V. disturbing.
H. Similarly concerned. Looking to conference & beyond, won’t it be more difficult to persuade minorities to accept safeguards? Who cd. have any confidence in safeguards applied by him?
R.M. But he is the leader of his Party: & we can’t stop him being 1st Minister when country is independent.
D.S. Can we escape this? We are giving the country its independence.
Even with this disability he cd. become a Minister.
We can’t hold him back. Surest way of bldg. him up is to continue to restrict him.
R.M. The minority tribes think they can cut him down in Parlt., more easily than if he remains outside.
D.S. Hope so: but believe we must be ready for worse alternative of his becoming leader.

Want time, however, to warn Welensky & some other C’wealth leaders.


K. Immedte risk of tribal war: can’t be averted w’out conference: and conference can’t succeed unless this restn on K. is removed.

Only real hope for Europeans is assocn in E. African federation.


Chance of that will be prejudiced if we make K. a martyr.
I.M. K.’s arrival in Ldn. has excited no notice. He is not national leader in Kenya: several areas which he can’t even enter. Process of reducing him to tribal leader has already gone some way.

I therefore support R.M.’s proposal.


Hail. If there is no national leader, can we concede independence – w’out creating another Congo. Mere association of tribes of which Europeans are one.
R.M. Only 2 courses in K.: rule it ourselves or find a constitution which safeguards minorities.
P.M. Govr. previously said tht. if this disqualification were removed it wd.

x| lead to w’drawal of many European officials.


R.M. Impossible to hold country for any length of time under direct rule.
I.M. Ch. Whip believes this will cause no political trouble her.

Shd it be timed to appear result of his visit to Ldn? Better Not?


R.M. Equally inadvisable for it to appear to flow from my visit to Kenya.
H. If Kenyatta became Ch. Minister we cdn’t rely on him to m’tain safeguards for minorities.
R.M. It is Kikiwu the others fear - & he wd. lead them even if outside Parlt.
M. Wait until R.M. has visited Kenya & talked to people there.
R.M. Govr. thinks x/ will still be bad but not so bad as he feared before.
H. & Hail. Ready to acquiesce in this decision: but it will lead to our having to stay longer, & keep troops longer in Kenya.
R.A.B. I agree.
P.M. This discussion illustrates real difficulty – how are we to handle future of Kenya as a whole. We are here up against our first Algeria problem. (as in Rhodesia). I’m not hopeful tht. Blundell solution will work. Possible, if we build safeguards into constitn on American model. But, if we can’t, we may have to buy out our colonies.

How far will amendment of this law affect this problem?


R.M. Timing?

Genl. feeling tht. it wd. be easier after R.M. had bn. in Kenya and talked to all parties there.


P.M. Adjourn discussion until next week & then widen it to include future of Kenya. Oral forecast by R.M.
7. Germany: Berlin.
H. Formula proposed by U.S. Still ambiguous: but U.S. say they do understand our position and believe this draft to give effect to it.
Hail. We are being asked once again to agree to a nonsense.

Ch. H. Seek amendment of last sentence – e.g. omit “if in fact such blockage of access to W. Berlin has occurred.”


H. x| I have already told U.S. that we won’t agree to this except as last resort if war seems imminent.
P.M. Dislike last sentence. For we know it’s imposs. to impose total embargo. This contemplates its continuance (and patent failure) for some months w’out a war. The concludg. words are nonsense because, as it is ineffective, it can’t avoid war.

If we accept, we shd. put on record in N.A.T.O. what we have said about our interpretn – i.e. x/ above.


H. Our postn lies in the middle sentence. Given that, can’t we swallow the last sentence with the explication above?
I.M. I support that view.
H. I will try to secure omission of final sentence. If I fail I will make clear on the record how we interpret it.

P.M. Allow discussion to proceed in N.A.T.O. – warning U.S. about last sentence in particular: as above i.e. warning them tht. if it passes in this form our understandg. of its meang. as already given to them will have to be put on record for imformn of our other Allies.



C.C. 62 (61) 14th November, 1961
1. Foreign Affairs. [Enter M.R.
H. a) Berlin. Kroll’s approach is being repudiated by Fed. Govt. But he may have known tht. A. wd. not mind much. Wait now for W’ton.

b) Congo. T. has declined to go to see Adoula at Leopoldville – fears for his life. A. won’t meet him outside Congo. Deadlock. Thought of conciliator being mooted – Spaak – doubtful. M’while another resoln in U.N. – Afr-Asians favouring forcing Adoula’s policies on T.


Can’t support their extreme resoln: cd. hardly veto: seeking a more moderate alternative. India/Ceylon have a draft which is not too bad but wd. envisage more force for U.N. Party unhappy over that.
Will report further on Thursday.
Hail. If T. is overborne by U.N., it will ruin chances of multi-racialism in neighbouring countries. Wd be intolerable to H/L.
I.M. Danger of Adoula losing out to Kisenga. Not surprised he won’t meet T. outside Leopoldville. Cd they meet in Embassy there?
H. Doubt if T. wd. feel safe even in an Embassy in Leopoldville. But we can try that.

x| Welensky agrees tht. Katanga has no future as independent & best chance is for T. to join with A. so as to put K. into clear minority.

U.N. asking us for bombs to use in Canberras supplied by India.
Difficult to refuse. Cd we grant on condn they don’t use (?).
Hail. Cdn’t defend that.
D.S. Diff. to refuse request from U.N.
P.M. Let them get the bombs from India, whence they got Canberras?

Dilemma. Remember origins – we feared R. wd. move in, and supported U.N. to prevent that. We welcomed a force.


Are we now to say it’s bn. badly handled: parties muse be left to come to terms: can’t allow U.N. to conquer the rebels: U.N. shd. therefore w’draw. This wd. pave way for K. & communists to gain power, & create great C. controlled state in centre of Africa.
We shd. remind Party tht. this is our objective. Welensky’s view X. is realistic. He thinks this is T’s last chance of getting federal system.

Some argue tht., if no agreement w’out U.N. pressure, the pressure wd. be justified to bring off the meeting. There is no future in Katanga independence.

D.S. If fear of assassination is T’s only fear, that cd. be overcome.
H. He also distrusts Adoula generally - & is open to influence of those who don’t want union.

Best hope is to get Sec. Genl. to suggest Embassy, rivér, conciliator – in hope tht. one may be acceptable.


H.W. Cd R.W. explain his view to Party?
H. He has done.
H. True Br. interest (because our investments mainly in A’s part) is to strengthen A. to force T. to come in. But v. dangerous to allow U.N. to use force. U.S. wd. be disposed to favour a more extreme resoln.
Suggest small mtg. of Ministers when text of resoln is available.
P.T. Can we act diplomatically with T. (instead of thru’ U.N.) – jointly with R.W., U.S. & Belgians – warning him not to use aircraft, or he will provoke forceful U.N. action.
H. Have tried this – no success. T. is surrounded by Belgian millionaires who tell him not to pay any attention.
P.T. Offer Br. or U.S. bodyguard.
S.Ll. A. wd. regard that as breach of sovereignty.
H.W. As agents of U.N?
S.Ll. They can’t use a Gt. Power – R. wd. insist on participn. Alternative: get U.S. to declare with us tht. financial support will cease if T. suffers any hurt.
P.M. For our immedte diffies wd. suit us if nothing happened on a resolution.
But long-term this wd. mean tht. A. & D. lose out to K. - & then our main objective is lost.
R.A.B. Don’t give bombs to U.N. Party wd. not stomach that.
H.W. Will seek technical excuse to delay this.
3. Nuclear Tests.
P.M. Mr.K. has made statement on Nov. 1. – criteria same as mine, but added his last sentence. When he considers prepns, finds both his sites are in Trust territories – we wd. give U.N. locus standi to object. He therefore asked me is he cd. use Xmas Island. M’while we have had to ask for underground test (Skybolt) in his facilities: and he has agreed.

Public pressures – in U.S. for resumption: in U.K. against it.

Xmas is under care/m’tenance at £1/2m a year: 300 R.A.F. personnel and 60 natives. 4-6 mos. to re-activate.

U.S. experts; picture of tests likely – alarming – 24 explosions totalling 10 megatons. Can’t tell yet wtr. Mr.K. wd. think this sort of thing to be “necessary.”

Prepns on Xmas cd. not be covert. Diff. to p’pone until main decision taken. Pressures wd. build up, however, when we start.
V. awkward.

Tel. conversation with Mr.K.


H.W. Saw Brown, who is willing to accept tighter criteria than A.E.C.
We shd. need 10 days or so to sort that out.
H.B. Support 7(a).
R.A.B. Why can’t they use their own territory – or ships.
I.M. Agree.
H.W. Clear advantage to us of joint testing.
Hail. Out object in reducg. U.S. tests to minimum is best achieved by putting U.K./U.S. rules of necessity. Join in therefore for this purpose.
H. Presentation. R. tests may have put them ahead. We may need more tests. Prepare for necessity in case it arises.
R.A.B. Don’t believe West shd. resume testing at all. Disliked P.M.’s statement. Prefer U.S. to do it alone.
D.E. If U.S. have enough already, hard to convince our public tht. they need any more tests.
P.M. Mr.K. as friendly but more negotiable – clearer mind & stronger character. E. was much more under influence of advisers.
V. satisfactory. But I don’t want any misunderstanding with him.

Not happy about going for scientific criteria. We may be pushed too far on that line.

Don’t want to go along and then draw back.

What of message on lines of para 6 of brief. i) to iii) But stress iv) including []. Tho’ I wd. regard it as a terrible blow to Anglo-U.S. relations. Add (v), (vi) and (vii). Cd have preliminary discn betwn. experts to define more precisely what is proposed. Then aim at main decision when we both meet - & no overt preparations at Xmas I. until then.


Hail. Channels to U.S. Don’t upset A.E.A./A.E.C. channel.
H.W. Our r.&d. generally is increasingly dependent on U.S. co-operation.
P.M. Will prepare draft, for further consideration.

[Enter P.M.G.

4. Post Office Giro System.
P.M.G. Explained proposal.
R.A.B. On balance favoured publn to test public opinion.
But surprised at strength of Bank’s re-action.
I.M. Why madden the Banks before we know what we intend.
M. I am opposed to everything.
H.B. Banks opening 10-3pm are not much use to workers.
Ty. believe it wd. be advantageous to the economy.
P.T. View of B/E.?
P.M.G. Ambivalent.
P.M. Banks shd. be taken seriously: we cdn’t run country’s economy without them: instruments of financial policy.
Defer – later discussion. [Exit P.M.G.
5. Commercial Policy: Poland.
F.E. As in memo.
C.S. Bacon market is likely to fall in early ’62. Recent rise is from a v. low level. Supply too great. Shall have to try vol. control by importers to put sense into market. Extra quota to Poland will destroy chance of persuading others esp. Denmark, to apply voluntary control. Danish herd is rising & they are trying to restrain it.

Longer term. para. 6 of memo. We can’t find anything to take from Poland except food – and lots of it bacon.

If we can’t control bacon market, pig subsidy will rise & I shall need a Suppl. Estimate.
P.T. Amount is marginal to bacon market as a whole.
Importance of getting aircraft exports into Iron Curtain countries.
H.B. Ty. interests conflict. Even so, we wd. support B/T. Balance lies that way. “Must put export interests first” (P.M. directive).
J.H. But gt. need for vol. agreement on bacon market.
R.A.B. Farmers will be upset, just at moment when they are growing more reasonable over C. Market.

Resume discussion next week.

Statistics to be produced.

C.C. 63 (61) 16th November, 1961
1. Parliament. [Enter M.R.
I.M. Business for next week.
R.A.B. Commonwealth Immigrants. Labour pressure will not be sustained for they know that public opinion is not with them. On the Irish aspect, I can quote Brookeboro’. It is impossible to control the border. I have obtained assurance tht. Eire will raise comparable points to our own.
M.R. Uneasiness in H/C. Desire tht. there shd. be some supervision of Irish Labour e.g. by requirement to show insurance card & prove he is in work.
R.A.B. This comes fr. N.I. But i) it wd. require legn here ii) we cdn’t deport a man because he has no work.
Hail. But it can be brought out tht. new power of deportn in Bill will be applied to Irish.
D.S. We have not had proper C’wealth consultn on this. No time was allowed.
It was read into R.A.B.’s speech at Brighton tht. final decisions had bn. taken. Some C’wealth Govts. are v. sore about it. Don’t let us pretend we consulted them properly.
P.M. We delayed for 4 years because we disliked it.
2. Congo.
H. Growing chaos. Adoula fears his Govt. may break up. Kisenga is drifting away: T. has not bn. brght. to confer. Needs strong resoln.

In N.Yk Ceylon/Liberia resoln condemning Katanga & ordering Sec. Genl. to deport mercenaries. U.S. agree this is unacceptable. Producg. resoln not much better qua encouraging U.N. forces to further action.


We are trying to moderate that in dirn of U.N. conciliation.
Alternatively, we cd. urge that course in speech & abstain on vote.
Adoula wd think this lets him down.
Another line wd. be to urge no resoln until Sec. Genl. has had time to consider & recommend.

Wd be v. strong Party feeling if we supported resoln urging stronger U.N. action.

Best course is to improve U.S. resoln and vote for it.

Fear the Congo will be chaotic for years to come.


Hail. Cd Adoula be persuaded to attack Kisenga: & so put himself in better position to draw closer to Tshombe.
3. Nuclear Tests.
P.M. Circulated draft message to M.K.
This commits us to i) small secret recce ii) mtg. of experts to define what is nature & purpose of tests, so that President and I cd. take a political judgement.

Have tried to introduce ques. of world opinion & U.S./U.K. moral position.

Supplementary message to Ambassador re meaning of reference to formal agreement. Finance, command, information. To avoid trouble we had had over Polaris.
H.W. Agree we shd. smoke out what they intend.
D.S. Support.
R.A.B. Shd we hint tht. we might look elsewhere? Marshalls.
P.M. They wd. need either to get into Trust trouble with U.N. or to incur vast expense in doing it wholly at sea.

Believe Mr.K. is under gt. pol. pressure: doesn’t himself want to test: courageously said not for pol. or propaganda reasons: but added, to reduce pressure, will make prepns in case we are compelled to do so.


Then finds he can’t prepare w’in own jurisdiction.
I.M. Pressure of world opinion over a period of months – wd. be intolerable.
P.M. We shd. have to stand on Mr.K.’s final sentence.
P.T. Will be diff. to satisfy public opinion why particular test falls w’in the definition.
P.M. Not if it’s true tht. it always leaks in U.S. tech. press.
Message approved.
4. Kenya.
Note not taken.
5. Malaya. Greater Malaysia. [Exit R.A.B.

D.S. Understanding reached btwn. Malaya & Singapore, but it’s dependent on incln of Borneo territories.

Problems a) to secure continued use of our base in Singapore for
S.E.A.T.O purposes

b) to secure consent of Borneo peoples to a merger

We shall see more clearly when we have heard Tunku’s plans.
H.W. Agree: no concessions from us until we know what they propose.
Singapore is of no value unless we can use it.
Don’t mention Labnan – it’s not an alternative to Singapore.
D.S. Presentation for Tunku: for S.E.A.T.O. is really protection for Malaya tho’ he has separated the two.

He wd. like S. to be termed a C’wealth base – no harm in that.


6. Airport Strike.
P.T. Claim is for 21/2 p.hour: total cost only £100 a wk. B.O.A.C. men are getting it. Device of up-grading some of the staff. May bring them back.

C.C. 64 (61) 21stNovember, 1961
1. Coal. [Enter R.W., M.R.
P.M. Long-term: re-organisation of industry.
R.W. Suggest I shd. first discuss with Rubens & then take guidance from E.P.C. or ad hoc Cttee.
H.B. Under aegis of E.P.C. – prs. a Sub-Cttee: after Ty. has worked with M/Power on the report of accountants.
P.M. Let me have proposals on method of handling this.
Short-term: price increases.
R.W. Issue now is betwn. selective increases and general increase. Group of Ministers were divided on this ques. of principle. If Cab. decide in favour of selective I have a modified schedule which N.C.B. cd. be persuaded to accept.
H.B. History: Cab. 2 yrs. ago rejected plan for higher prices in Scotl. & lower in Midlands: E.P.C. in 1960 again rejected proposal for higher Sc. prices.
We now see prospect of v. grave financial deficiency for N.C.B. They are ready to meet it, but believe differential price increases are an essential part of their armoury to deal with it.

Some Ministers wd., however, prefer to over-ride views of N.C.B. and go for genl. increase. I doubt if this wd. be in long-term interests of industry. Each region protected by transport costs: unremunerative to send coal to other regions: differential regional price will help to damp regional demand & encourage closure of high-cost pits. A uniform increase will mean selling less coal from low-cost pots (because competition of oil) and more than we need of high-cost coal.


J.M. See this argument. But efforts to make Sc. industry more efficient & competitive will be frustrated by this. More worried by this than by house-coal (wh. on Annex B. proposals wd. be tolerable).
Effect on steel can’t be assessed w’out discn with Colvilles. Admit tht. effect on other industry wd. be more psychological than real.

This might precipitate demand for review of Scotland’s future as whole.

Colvilles will seek leave to import U.S. coal.
H.B. Remedy for this is to press N.C.B. to temper wind to Sc. steel industry.
M. Believe N.C.B. shd. continue policy of m’taining parity of pit-head price throughout country. If it is to be broken, this plan is best that can be devised.
R.W. Not true tht. pit-head prices have bn. uniform till now. Coal-field adjustments have always bn. made to prevent coal from coming in from other regions.
F.E. Now is time to abandon rigid principle. Prices of delivered coal obscure the principle anyway.
I.M. Support principle – mainly because I think we shd. not be harsh on Scotland.
If Cab. decn goes the other way, Sc. increase must be p’poned till May.
H.B. Decn has not bn. taken on the principle in the past – only love for Scotland.

Subsidy to inefficient pits is not the way to help Scotland. Less wasteful to subsidise the right kind of industry to move to Scotland when labour is available.

A general price increase wd. tend to keep less efficient pits going.
E.M. Can’t deny Rubens what he needs – unless we have convincing reasons.
Support selection increases.
R.A.B. So do I. (no reason given).
P.M. We directed steel industry to Scotland: we shd. see tht. it gets its coal at reasonable rate. Must get it from Scotland. N.C.B. shd. make a special price for Colvilles.

Other industries?


J.M. New ones mainly rely on electricity.
D.E. N.C.B. charged to run industry w’out subsidy, at maximum output.
He is bound to follow selective prices, for this is his only means of exploiting the “closed” markets near the coal-fields. If we don’t allow him to do this, he must be free to ask for subsidy or to see competn of oil win. On economics the case made by H.B. is unanswerable.
Hail. In present circs. surely we shd. follow the better economic course.
Let us help Scotland certainly, but in the right way.
S.Ll. Support R.W. This is step in right direction – it may lead to differentials in wage structure.
I.M. You will never achieve that.

J.H. I now favour modified plan for selective increases.


But we shd. know a) will this slow down closing pits.

b) shall we let Colvilles import U.S. coal?


H.B. a) No: contrary. b) Tell N.C.B. to make special deal for Colvilles.
S.Ll. Timing?
R.W. Increases wd. have to be put to Industrial Consumers Council in early Dec. I think they shd. go also to Domestic Council at same time. I wd. hope to get house prices increased not until May. Also (in reply to I.M.) I ought to make announcement on Wed. before my Borrowing Bill comes on for 2nd Rdg.
R.W. N.C.B. will be sensitive to Colvilles because will fear request for U.S. imports.
P.T. Impossible for Govt. to defend insistence on general price increase:
means requiring him to charge more for coal from efficient pits etc.
E.M. In 5/10 yrs. balance will tilt strongly in favour of oil because pipelines.
P.M. General feeling of Cab. in favour of Minister’s modified plan, subject to an assurance that some means will be found to temper the wind to [Colville’s] steel industry in Scotland.
R.W. Easier if I refrained from insistg. on p’ponement of increase in “other large coal” in Sc. and N.W. This wd. help me over Colville’s.
Agreed.
2. Congo.
H. Circulated draft U.N. resoln. First para. mght. be read as encouraging U.N. forces to go in with Adoula to remove mercenaries from Katanga.

I’m nervous of this.


Hail. Why shd. U.N. use force to remove T.’s political advisers?
H. In resoln of 21/2 we deprecated presence of these advisers = tho’ force then limited to preservation of law & order.
Hail. The moral posn of U.N. in Congo will be destroyed by this.
H. U.N. case: so long as 60/70 people using airplanes…
I.M. Wd prefer to abstain on these 2 paras.
M.R. Agree. Might be better to abstain on whole resoln.
H. We shd. then be alone, with French
H. Vote for resoln: abstain on these 2 paras.

This is supported by U.S. – with Liberia or U.A.R.


P.M. If we abstained on whole resoln, we shd. be w’drawing fr. whole opern.
We have gt. interest in stability of Congo. Cdn’t be right to dis-interest ourselves in its future.

Party opinion cd. be satisfied by abstaining on these 2 paras.


Ch.H. Is there same objn to 2nd para?
H. But it wd. involve bombing aircraft on the ground.
R.A.B. Wd be almost as unpopular with Party.
Hail. Wd discuss aerial warfare in support of central Govt. of Congo.
H.B. More difficult to defend abstaining on 2nd para.
P.M. Can argue tht. both paras. give too heavy a responsibility to Secretariat.
Believe better approach is by conciliatory methods. We still prefer approach followed h’to.
3. Nuclear Tests.
H. R. have accepted our invitn to resume Geneva Conference.
4. O.E.C.D.
S.Ll. Turned out well. Target not v. unrealistic.

C.C. 65(61). 23rd November, 1961.
1. Parliament. [Enter M.R.
I.M. Business for next week.
P.M. Coal (Borrowing Powers) Bill: Wedy. Will be diff. debate – both

on prices (Scotland) and also on wages. R.W. will need help:

from I.M. and others: prs. a Ty. Minister shd. speak. Prs.

Fin. Secy.


D.E. Illustrates urgency of producg. Wh. Paper on wages policy. For

opinions are hardening on both sides.


S.Ll. T.U.C. demand. Propose to see them on Tuesday & press on with

machinery for planning.


P.M. Believe this is temporary flash in T.U.C: moderates will swing it

round after the next meeting.


2. Berlin.
H. Memo & Annex written before A.’s talks with Mr.K.

Concensus of opinion: narrow issue of Berlin as subject for negotn.

No evce tht. R. will continue to allow Allied access & existing

status of W. Berlin. But if they wd. there may be basis for a

deal – main diffies will be over relns betwn. W. Germany &

W. Berlin and nuclear weapons.


R.A.B. Is it still our aim to secure re-unification?
H. Must hold it out as ultimate prospect, in order to get W. Germans to

look at any interim settlement. Even R. are ready to pay

lip-service to this.
M. Can we envisage end of mil. occupn?
H. Group haven’t faced this. I wd. prefer to argue tht. our presence

rests on invitation of W. Berlin authies – not conquest.


Hail. Unrealistic – i) looks for improvement of access.

ii) unchanged source of Allied rights – i.e. conquest.

Much of memo. turns its back on realities.

iii) exclusion of E. German traffic from an international

autobahn.
H. Our time-table: to get a Western posn before N.A.T.O. mtg. Reason

to hope that R. will wait for that.

P.M. Attitude of de Gaulle. May be influenced by A.’s talk with Mr K.
Agreed: persevere in attempt to negotiate.
3. Malaya.
D.S. Talks with Tunku successful. Agreed to establish commission to

ascertain wishes of peoples of Borneo territories. Agreement

on defence wh. secures our objectives – use of Singapore base.

Special advantage of incldg. words “S.E.A.”.

Agreed to make it clear in statements tht. i) we wd. not transfer this

base to others, e.g. S.E.A.T.O. ii) we shd. be free, however, to

use it for S.E.A.T.O. purposes. Tho’ Tunku may well say we

can’t. Main point is tht. it is agreed we can use it for what we

regard as protection for S.E.A. Don’t make it more difficult

for him.
H.W. Also they will discuss means of taking over our I.S. commitment.


4. Europe: Common Market.
E.H. Brussels Mtg. Statements of Six were reasonable fr. their angle: did

not reject our proposals re C’wealth, tho’ they asked about

duration.

Our 2nd objective was to get negotiations going. On this Fr. adopted

delaying tactics via procedure. Compromise: i) genl. review of

common tariff & C’wealth ii) detailed negotiation on C’wealth

ques. Y’day they competed i) and have started on ii) – with

manufacturers from Canada.

Geneva mtg: E.F.T.A. Reported on Six discussions. Neutrals have

now decided to apply for association – at mtg. on 15/xii. U.S.

posn on this, so far, is hostile. Norway likely to apply in Jan.

for full membership. Portugal want assocn on Gk. model, leadg.

to membership in 15/20 years. Acceleration of tariff redns:

Agreed tht. 5 will move in March & the other 2 in Sept.


5. Local Government: Greater London.
Ch.H. L.a.’s concerned accept that changes must be made.

Draft W. Paper accepts diagnosis of R. Commn and its

recommendations subject to

i) larger boros: 33: provisional & subject to consultns

ii) educations: a central area of 2 m. populn.

I.M.’s points. No objn to (a). Accept (b): wd. involve a one year

p’ponement of next elections for L.C.C. & M’sex.
R.A.B. Consider we shd. accept R.C. findings in principle.

But must realise it is a major pol. decision. Oppn from Labour

in central Ldn. and from Tories in the fringe areas.

Education. I wd. have preferred to settle against a Joint Board before

* W. Paper is published. (para. 43). Must also remember tht. this

central l.e.a. is bound to be Socialist.

Support 33 boro’ concept.

Subject to * I support this W. Paper.


D.E. I wd. have preferred joint Bd. or direct election. People elected to

Greater Ldn. council mght. not be interested in education.


I.M. Despite repns made to me, I agree we shd. do this.

Wd have preferred to accept R.C. on boros., to avoid charge of

gerry-mandering. But forced to admit force of Dpt.’s

arguments to contrary.


D.S. Add summary of powers wh. wd. be exercised by the various

authorities.


H.B. Ready to accept education plan as in W. Paper – subject to one point

only.


Quoted from R.C. report on need for boros. to have some hand in

education. Is it right to exclude e.g. Chelsea & Hampstead from

education of their children. Want therefore to insert some

promises of associating them in some way in this.


Hail. The 2 m. plan weakens the case for the general scheme.

Wd prefer a two-tier plan for education – overall planning authy with

adminn by boros.
Ch.H. This part of R.C. report was hotly criticised by educationists.

Of course, from l. govt. angle it wd. be preferable.

Joint board. V. unpopular in l. govt. Members become remote both

from electors and from boros. they represent.


H.B. Strong appeal to publish & allow p. opinion to express itself.
K. Adminn of justice. Not sure it will be left untouched.

Some changes in P.S. Divns. M’sex Sessions. Re-organisation

x/ of Ldn. Sessions. Wd prefer to add a para. saying this will need

considn.



Agreed.
I.M. y/ I wd. also want to draft a para. on my (a).
Agreed: Ch.H., in consultn with I.M., K. & R.A.B. to

draft para. covering x and y/.


6. Wages Policy.
J.H. Can I tell Party Cttee that it wd. be wrong to take power to fix

wages in natd indies.


P.M. V. large change in character of natd industries. Wd have to be

considered as a general ques.



C.C. 66(61). 30th November, 1961.
1. Sir W. Churchill. [Enter M.R.
P.M. Message of congratulations from Cabinet.
I.M. Will be welcomed if he comes to H/C.
2. Cabinet Secretariat.
P.M. Bishop’s departure to M/Ag. Wish him well.
3. Parliament.
I.M. Business for next week.
4. Congo.
H. We abstained & dissociated ourselves fr. Afro-Asian resoln.

H/C. F.A. Cttee content with our action so far. They fear tht.

Sec. Genl. may still go too far. Y’day’s violence has put back

chances of A. & T. meeting. Tho’ latter has said he’s willing

to have distinguished African to mediate.
5. Germany: Berlin.
(a) Talks with General de Gaulle.
P.M. Mtgs. of Heads of Govts. – bilateral, but no sign of multi-lateral.

Mr K. wants to negotiate. We are nearing to negotiatg posn – tho’

Dr A.’s posn is too narrow. de G. remains opposed: for he

fears German resentment at “another Versailles” when G.

becomes a strong nation against, and he wants Fr. to have no

part in that: content to leave Anglo-Saxons to the dirty work.

This puts us in diffy – as shown in my message.

K. is prob. willing to wait – for a bit.


H. Schroder says no alternative to negotn. Looks as tho’ G. can be brght.

along. Essential ingredients & formula for D.D.R. & something

on frontier. Believe G. in the end will accept those: tho’ A.

dared says so now for fear of leaks. N.A. Council will press for

negotns. Ultimate ques. is wtr. we go on w’out French. May

need a mtg. of W. Heads of Govts. to settle that ques.

Where de G. is wrong is tht. sitn on the ground in Berlin is

dangerous.

P.M. Will circulate records of mtg. with de G. – see and return.

Impressions of de Gaulle.

I mght. have bn. reluctant to press him on G. if that wd. have made

more diff. on C. Market. But looks as tho’ he is as stiff on that

as on G. This being so, we prob. risk little on C. Market by

pressing him on G. and isolating the French.

Au fond, de G. believed that Anglo-Saxons will avert war and he

will be able to say nous sommes trahis but enjoy the benefits.

Choice for us now: do we bring pressure from bottom up, or do

we have a mtg. of Heads of Govts. H. and I will consider,

with Mr K.
(b) Economic Counter-Measures.
P.M. Summd concln. Take note. Remember tht. we shd. not press our

objns so far as to weaken our influence on them over the negotns.


H. Believe U.S. will accept a more sensible formula on embargo. Will

report this later to Cab.


(c) Military Planning.
H.W. Summarised memo. C. 195.

Command in Berlin. We shall have to accept U.S. general. He wd. be

under Norstadt. Confusion is possible because of N.’s double

role (para. 11).

Recommendations (para. 15).
R.A.B. Discussed in Def. Cttee y’day.

Doubt over ‘deploy’ in 15(d): resolved after discn in Def. Cttee.

Does not involve commitment.
C.S. Only 56 men?
H.W. No: (d) refers to whole garrison.
S.Ll. Second half of (b)?
H.W. It wd. give us time to intervene.

Memo. C. 187. Took note with approval.


6. Decimal Coinage. [Enter Macpherson.
P.M. Let Mr Pallister speak!
S.Ll. To our economic advantage to make this change – esp. if we cd.

synchronise with A. & N.Z.

Recommn: declare readiness in principle & set up Commn to

ascertain method & cost. Consultn with industry. Time-table

& date. Then final Govt. decn. But admit tht. if we have

announced decn of principle, diff. to draw back. On other

hand v. feeble to set up Commn w’out a decn of principle.
K. Believe we may look silly.
R.A.B. Favour enquiry – para. 22 of Officials’ report.
M. Believe this meritable. But don’t accept in principle.
P.T. Support M.’s view.
Hail. Don’t want to lose £. Why not decimalise on basis of £.
P.M. No decision in principle.

But set up Commn – saying we are now satisfied tht.

there wd. be sufft advantage in making this change

to warrant making a full-scale investign into its cost.


Agreed.
7. Wages: Firemen.
R.A.B. By decn of 1959? we devolved responsibility for pay to council

y/ of l.a.’s. K. (then at H.O.?) said Min. intervention wd. no longer

be justifiable because of genl. grant.

I have however told them it cd. be breach of pause if they awarded

any increase before Feb. ……… [out of room].
Ch.H. We can’t disengage & on basis we have no power. We have tried

that before & failed. Moreover, we have some power under

general grant.

Shd we not say this is pre-pause commitment because promise to Ldn.

and M’sex. If we don’t, we must allow Ldn. & M’sex. as

x/ pre-pause commitment, but express disapproval of award

elsewhere by positive action under general grant.
J.H. Not sure there is much of a pre-pause commitment.

But on balance I incline to x/.


P.T. S.Ll. will be savagely attached for anything which can be interpreted

as breach of pause.


R.A.B. Much concerned about y/.
P.M. Cd say this is emergency national need which over-rides that.

Cd we appeal to them to settle (rest of country) for Jan. 1.


Ch.H. Add: we regard this a pre-pause package.
M. If we don’t get this w’in our rules, we are sunk.
I.M. Admit Ldn. & M’sex. as pre-pause. No power to stop increases

elsewhere, but we will adjust genl. grant so as to ensure we

don’t make any Exch. contn towds. increases paid before

Jan. or Feb.

P.M. Appeal to them to date remainder from Jan. 1. Make it plain tht. if

they choose a much earlier date, we shall indicate disapproval

& reserve our posn on genl. grant.
Ch.H. If we can regard rest of country as truly consequential, we can regard

the whole thing as pre-pause package (?). Unless we do, other

counties (Dec. or Jan.) will be regarded as breach of pause

policy.
R.A.B. Formula – for a message to Joint Council.


S.Ll. If it has to be a single settlement, we cd. defend a package over

whole country, so long as not retrospective.


After further discussion agreed tht. Secretariat shd.

prepare draft formula for considn.


J.H. Send separate message to employers’ side tht. they shd. not

encourage arbitration.


Agreed.

[Enter J.A., P.M.G.

8. Blue Streak.
P.T. If we drop this, we cdn’t come back into rocketry. Case for going on

is not scientific but mil., technological, communns. Some hope

of succeeding in getting European consortium. But U.S.

competitors try to detach members, by bribery of every kind –

& are now concentratg. on Italy. Believe tht, if we said we

were going on & were ready to carry Italian share, we might pull

if off & keep I. in.

I am still £4 m. w’in the Ty. authy of months ago – 26 m. Mght. be

worth going to £33 m. Keep Woomera out of this argument.

This decn wd. enable me to get Fr. & G. support to push this thro’.


H. New German condns a) no financial contn until convention signed.

b) no sign. until known who else will sign.


P.T. I wd. advise rejection of a) & I believe G. wd. accept that.

H.B. Cab. has not seen this since July ’60, when they gave authy tht. work

shd. go on until end of ’60. We started at 17½ m., went to 26,

now asked for 33. Other countries are hesitating to commit

themselves until picture is clear. Why shd. we? We are not

committed if Italy drops out. We can’t afford to carry Italian

share. Continuing with this will cut us out of other projects.

The valuable scientific elements will prob. be undertaken by

G. & others, not us.
Hail. Commns = only potential commercial gain. Then only if this

launcher is used - & that seems doubtful.

Cdn’t accept continuance of this as ground for reducg. expenditure

on scientific projects.


H.W. Why are U.S. trying so hard to get us out of this, unless they see

somethg. practical in it. Motive surely must be to break our

communications near-monopoly.
D.S. If we were startg. fr. scratch, we mght. not think this worthwhile.

Can it be right to throw away now all that we have staked.


S.Ll. Ques. for decision to-day is smaller tactical ques. – what is best way

of getting consortium into life.


H.B. Yes: admit that. My case is para. 13.
D.S. Support P.T. Italy more likely to come in if they think it is going

to come off.


P.T. France won’t carry Ital. share. If I wait, U.S. will increase their

efforts to buy them off. If I say tht., if need be, we will carry

Ital. share, I can get Fr. & G. to come along - & I also believe

tht. gives best chance of getting I. in. M’while, so long as we

wait, we spend £35.000 p. wk.(?) on carrying on alone.
P.M. Let P.T. have chance to make one more effort to

bring them in on basis wh. he proposes.


Agreed.

C.C. 67(61). 5th December, 1961.
1. Congo. [Enter M.R.
H. If Ques. re O’Brien: shall reply tht. his emplt. is matter for U.N.

& Irish Govt. Policy of H.M.G. has bn. expld in Parlt.

Shan’t disclose opinions we have expd privately. Genl.

concensus tht. he shd. go

Bombs for U.N. Canberras. Bunche is pressing for them. If

we decline, we shall be said to be favouring Katanga.

But if air-war starts, Ts. & Kisengar will get planes

from R. or elsewhere. Indians unwilling to supply for same

reasons as ours.
P.M. Cd we get common line, publicly, with India. Try & concert that,

in Delhi.


D.S. Are we sure India has bn. asked & declined?
H. Believe informally in N. Yk. May not have got to Nehru. Awkward

if he didn’t agree with our view. Wiser to take unilateral view

tht. this wd. risk extension of fighting. But will explore with

P.D. and G. Booth possibility of a common line.


[Enter Perth.

2. United Nations.


a) Debates & Resolutions.
H. Wish to draw Cab.’s attention to this problem. But see no scope for

any rule. Must look at each case on merits. Honest policy

doesn’t pay us in short run: hope it may in long run when we

come to resoln re own dependencies.


T. Agree. We must not complicate our own Colonial posn.
S.Ll. Non-participn, on Fr. model, can sometimes be useful. Less

offensive than abstaining in some circs.


H. My advice, thro’ Ambassadors, is tht. Fr. conduct in U.N., has

worsened their posn in the world as cpd. with ours.

We do make our views plain – in Assembly & Cttee. More awkward

problem is executive resolns in Sec. Council.


Hail. Unless we vote against in Sec. Council we can’t say tht. resoln carried

has no validity. It has & in law we ought to comply with it.

I wd. favour voting against sometimes – even tho’ it = Veto.

Pity we can’t carry old C’wealth with us in these matters in Assembly.

D.E. Diffy of our posn not understood here. Need for publicity.
H. Shall do this in a speech before Xmas.
D.S. Also lr. to [some] ‘wealth P.M.’s explaining our diffies.

Prs. to all, not some, in diff. terms.


P.M. At end session, do x/.

Also promote turn-over article in Times or D.T.

Consider more formal exposition e.g. in Wh. Paper.

These steps shd. be concerted by H. – soon after Xmas.


b) Chinese Representation.
H. Two-stage U.S. plan. How do we vote on first? It is an important

a. ques. and we can vote for that. Next a R. resoln in favour of

b. Peking being seated: we shall vote for that, tho’ deprecating

language. Tho’ if U.S. get blocking ⅓rd against it, we shall

in effect have moratorium. Shd we therefore propose something

c. more constructive – e.g. study group to consider means of

resolving this ques. a. & b. seem clear to me: doubtful about c.
S.Ll. Is it right to vote for b. before provision is made for Formula?
Hail. Can we support whole of R. resoln (Annex)? Offensive & untrue.
D.S. Simple resoln of our own – seating Peking & providing seat for F.
H. We shd be chucked out of Peking if we recommended seating of F.

Can’t amend R. resoln, or have clause by clause vote, unless R. agree.

All we can do is to dissociate ourselves, in speech, from 1st 3 paras.
P.M. 1. Vote for a.

2) Vote for R. resoln: but, in lieu of references to

Formosa (para. 9), make it plain that third para.

is offensive to U.N. [& untrue because even if

wrong its not unlawful].
H. If R. resoln carried, Formosa wd. be out & never wd. be admitted

because of R. & Ch. veto. Advantage of c. is tht. it wd. keep

Formosa issue alive.
S.Ll. There wd. be wide support for a resoln c.
H. x It wd. be useful only if U.S. succeed in blocking b.

We asked U.S. to get someone to propose c. They have failed.

x If R. resoln were carried, c. would fall.
Agreed: as proposed by P.M. above.

[Put fwd. c. only if R. resoln is not carried.]

Put c. on order paper – if poss. in a form wh.

enables it to run wtr. R. resoln is carried or not.

3. Tariff Policy. G.A.T.T.
F.E. 1st day – tariff ques. 2nd underdeveloped 3rd agriculture.

* Agric: remitted to study groups some Fr. proposals.

2nd: we had done well, cdn’t do more until others matched us.

G.A.T.T. is changing. New countries. Emphasis on agric. problems

& markets for products fr. underdeveloped.
E.H. * may be used by Fr. to delay us on C. Market.
F.E. I warned v. that & had some support.
4. Firemens’ Wages.
R.A.B. Council will meet again on 8/12 to discuss operative date.

When they take a decision, Govt. attitude can be made publicly clear.

Doubt if men will accept 8/12 date.
H.B. Shd we advice employers to stand out for ½ or 1/1, knowing men won’t

accept. Or shd. we acquiesce in 8/12, if that’s best they can do.

Logically 2nd course is not unreasonable. But may not seem

tough enough. Employers are convinced tht. gap between

13 July & 8 Dec. is long enough to m’tain gap betwn. pay in

difft areas for same work. They will try for N. Year date if told

to do so, but their heart won’t be in it. At arbitration Oct. 1.

mght. well be fixed.


R.A.B. Cdn’t use genl. grant in these circs.
J.H. Logically 8/12 is reasonable. But from angle of pause Jan. 1. would

be better. Fits with Wages Council awards when there was

pre-pause commitment. If we connived at 8/12 and it failed,

we shd. be heavily criticised.


R.A.B. No chance of getting Jan. 1. accepted.
H.B. I agree.
S.Ll. 8/12 at least avoids retrospectn. Arbitn would not.
I.M. Support J.H. This wd. show Govt. determinn to hold pause for as long

as possible.


R.A.B. For sake of 3 wks’ pay, we offend l.a.’s and enrage firemen.

Only condn on wh. I cd. agree to this wd. be to drop threat of

genl. grant altogether.
Ch.H. Our only chance of defending this is as a pre-pause package.

If we can get that across, diffce betwn. 8/12 and 1/1 is not

important.

I.M. Agree with Ch.H.


M. But this is only excuse for a date as early as 1/1.
K. Unwilling to abandon genl. grant threat.
H.B. We were thinking of threatening it for concession of 31/10 date at

time when we favoured ½. Not the same for a diffce of 3 wks:

8/12 as against 1/1.
P.T. Either accept 8/12 & defend as pre-pause packet.

Or stick to 1/2 and use general grant threat.

On balance favour second course.


S.Ll. If we want settlement, no objn to 8/12.

If we don’t because of rlwaymen etc., better stick to 1/2.


D.E. If this is pre-pause package, cd. be differentiated fr. rlwaymen etc.,

which are all wholly new claims.

It is pari passé with teacher categories wh. are now being raised

consequentially.


P.M. Alternatives: Let them settle for 8/12 with pre-pause package justificn.

Tell them they must not take earlier date than 1/1:

a. re-affirming threat.

b. not re-affirming it.

Let these be stated in writing.

Final decision at Thursday’s Cabinet.

Or prs. P.M. mtg. Wedy evening.
5. Commonwealth Immigrants.
R.A.B. Party mtg. y’day p.m. D.S. and Att.G. came with me.

Treston & Co. will continue to make trouble. Believe we

mght. carry Bill.
M.R. Might lose as many as 30 votes on some amendments. But cd. keep

a bare majority.


Our plan for Irish must be more plainly stated – also our understandg.

with Eire to pass complementary legn.

Hope R.A.B. will make wide statement on Gaitskell’s amendment.
R.A.B. Bad tactics. Cd deal with W. Indian point only. Thus avoid having

bad division at outset.


M.R. Shall have continuing trouble until we make our posn clear on Irish.
P.M. Can do that on “Clause 1 stand part” – possibly make that public.
M.R. Also put down to-night (& mention to-day) amendment re duration

of Bill.
R.A.B. Plan for landing cards will not apply to traffic from N.I. – for

necessary amendment of Bill wd. lose us support of N.I.

members and Govt.


I.M. Balance of argument – in favour of earliest exposn of Govt.

attitude on Irish.


P.M. Get it out as soon as poss. In answer to Gaitskell’s

amendment if he gives the opening (by referring to

Irish): if he doesn’t, on Clause 1 stand part.

[Exit R.A.B., E.H.


6. Emigration to the Commonwealth.
D.S. Expenditure limit. I wd. leave it alone. Changing it to £750.000 wd.

only invite amendment. And wd. make it seem that we were

less interested.

Actual expenditure Australia: want to raise this to £300.000 p.a.

This wd. still be only 7½% of scheme.
H.B. The £150.000 extra is a hand-out to Austr. It makes no increase

in nos. emigrating. This contrasts pretty meanly with the

economies which other Dpts. are making.
D.S. We shd. gain good-will in Australia, which we need at present.
H. Compare this with hardships forced on F. Service.
D.S. I won’t press at present for the money – reserve my right to raise

it later.


J.H. I’m not sure about renewal of the Act. In economic terms it’s

no longer justified.


H.B. No: posn has changed radically since 1920’s.

D.S. But the powers shd. surely be renewed – for traditional period

of five years.
Agreed: renew, as matter of routine.

[Exit H.
7. Education: C.A.T.’s.


D.E. Ministers agreed tht. case for transfer is genl. grant was so urgent tht.

we shd. not wait for Robbin’s Cttee. I have negotiated with

l.a. for 1st Jany. Fatal to p’pone it now.
H.B. Figures supplied were incomplete. £3 m. was given: assumed transfer

to Exch. wd. be £1½ m. Now appears tht. £8½ m. is at stake, and

half of that is difft matter in view of S.Ll.’s pledge of not more

than 2½% rise. This means an automatic addn of £3 m. or so –

which will increase our diffy in honouring the pledge.
D.E. We are not choosing a date for the first time.

On the figures: rates share of C.A.T.’s is included: we can’t recover

it until later.
H.B. Decn can be re-considered when figures on which it was taken are

found to be wrong.


P.M. Decision cd. be p’poned until we see general picture

of next year’s expenditure. Next week.


D.E. M’while I must continue negotiations.
8. Agriculture: Meat Research.
Hail. As in memo.

I accept Ty. view: and so did J.H. and J.M. But A.R.C. and C.S. are

opposed. Vital work held up because we can’t agree. Public

scandal.
H.B. We were near agreemt. in June. H.A. Cttee cd. have settled it, if C.S.

had bn. ready to agree. Ty. ready to compromise by finding

whole of capital cost if running costs were aided by levy from

trade. Genl. principle of Govt. research tht. industry shd. make

a contn: who shd. this be exempt?


C.S. All research so far is paid for – at Govt. stations. Ty. say tht. as we

are now to do more, trade shd. contribute.

Contns by industry to D.S.I.R. research is mostly for development.

This is for fundamental research.

How explain to industry – for meat alone?

How can we apportion so small a sum? About ½ p. sheep slaughtered.

Trouble isn’t worth risking for these sums.
F.E. Our research levies are practicable only because firms are willing.
J.M. When I agreed with Ty. it was thght. to be practicable. Adminve

diffies are now seen to be more difficult.


J.H. Cdn’t we raise the money thro’ Fatstock Guarantee scheme.
P.M. This contribn shd. be made if it is practicable to

collect it. Must ascertain that before any

announcement of capital grant is made.

K. to consider & report wtr. any is practicable.



C.C. 68(61). 7th December, 1961.
l. Parliament. [Enter Renton, M.R.
I.M. Business for next week.

C’wealth Immigration. Shall need guillotine: motion on final

Tuesday – to be announced next Thursday. One more day

(Tues. next) on Bill before the motion. Will give time for H/C.

to settle down, over Xmas, on this ques.

Xmas Recess: 21st Dec. to 23rd Jan. (Tues.) to be announced to-day.

Before Xmas two genl. debates – one on f. affairs (mainly Congo)

and one on genl. economic policy (pay-pause etc.).


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