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I.M. If no Ty. interest, I wd. support £11 m.

C.S. 1d off pool price of milk, when costs are rising by 0.8d, this is pretty

stiff.
H.B. I wd. accept £11 m. if it’s final.
J.H. Sorry C.S. is not expanding small farmers’ scheme as means of

enabling us to reduce general price subsidies.


H.B. I wd. favour £2½ m. on that scheme and same off fertiliser subsidy.

C.S. Cd extend to larger farms. But want to keep this in reserve for next

year when we are in C. Market.
D.E. Public will wonder if we have bn. tough enough on beef.
Agreed: at £11 m.

C.C. 20(62). 8th March, 1962.
1. Parliament. [Emter M.R.
I.M. Business for next week.
2. Smoking and Health. [Enter E.P., A.B.
A.B. S.Ll. concerned about “and to discourage”.

Preferred is para. H. of App. B. If we try to “discourage” we

may be led on to the further measures, or some of them.
P.M. ? Stop at “known”.
R.A.B. Twice considered – rejected para. 10 of App. B.

But admit this is an advance on earlier Govt. statement of

policy.
Hail. Unreal point. The facts do discourage.
P.M. Dislike paternalism of ‘discourage’.
E.P. It is a duty of l.a.’s to discourage if they believe it dangerous.
P.M. Vice discourage say “& to make clear to the public the dangers to

health of smoking, particularly cigarette smoking”.

[Exit E.P.
3. Disarmament. [Enter Godber.
General.
H. Memo. for informn.

U.S. reluctant to table constructive proposals.


J.G. Memo. represents posn reached.

i) Chairmanship not agreed. West proposing

co-Chairmen (U.S. & R.) who will steer from behind,

while actual Chair rotates between remaining 16.

ii) French not participating at all.

iii) Inspn & verification is crucial issue – R. willing only to

have it applied to material destroyed.

Procedure - First, genl. debate on objectives.

Secondly, want to follow this with package deal (59).

U.S. have promised proposals on some on

Sunday, esp. on delivery vehicles.
Third, initial list for 3 For. Ministers. Tho’ others

suspicious of any steering by 3 or more

nuclear items.

H. (iii) is crucial.


J.G. Sampling idea comes from Pugwash. Each country divided into

zones, which cd. be subject to comprehensive inspn à choix.

Alternative, inspn of categories of weapon.

y/ Or, Western offer of one-for-one destruction: wh. conforms to R. posn.


H.W. Support memo. qua military considns.

We shd. try to get U.S. into line.


J.G. Can’t assess U.S. attitude because really their Disarmament agency

isn’t ready.


D.S. x/ Hope we shall be f’coming in general debate – to avoid being

out-done by K. in propaganda.


H. We aren’t committed to take U.S. line: but we must remember tht. it

is they who have to disarm, not us.


K. Analysed memo. What chances have we of getting 9 package

adopted as W. position, in face of U.S. reluctances.

Para. 12. Have we over-estimated need for internatl inspn? Have R. got a point here.
[P.M. This is nuclear only – discuss separately.]

Attach importance to para. 13.

Danger for us: need to tag along with U.S. may prevent us from

dealing with the real diffies.


J.G. U.S. are said to be more fwd. in thinking than ever before.

We shall have 2 wks. of genl. debate in which to align ourselves

with U.S. They have promised disclosure to us at week-end.
Hail. Do we believe in genl. disarmament? Does it not involve scrapping

our R.A.F. & R.N. – if we are to have only internal security

forces.
H. We cd. have forces to ensure internal security in other countries where

we had responsibility.


D.S. No, surely. Treaty obligns wd. go in favour of internatl force.
H. Colonies wd. be “internal”.
H.W. A v. long-term objective. Cdn’t move fast towards it.
D.S. But don’t hedge our adherence to ultimate objective. cf. x/ above.
P.M. Not sure K. does get advantage by his extreme offers.

No one was impressed by his suggn of 18 Heads of Govt.


H. y/ is a good idea. If R. refuse, we cd. offer %age redn.
Nuclear Tests.
P.M. Concerned about i) offer on non-transfer of n. weapons. Will be

taken as aimed at French. Cdn’t be policed: and therefore

contrary to our genl. view on inspn. Wd preclude our handing

our n. strength to N.A.T.O. etc.


(J.G. No “to any State” does not include transfer to an Alliance.)
P.M. Wd at least prevent Anglo-French, or Anglo-German, arrangemt. Will

Agreed. harm us in C.M. negotns. At least make sure thro’ Dixon tht. it

won’t give F. a handle v. us on C. Market.

If it’s assurance to R. re G., better do it in a Berlin agreement.

ii) Mr K. said he wd. make new proposals: U.S. now

seem reluctant. Our scientists now believe natl detectn wd. be

effective on all tests down to 5 meg. save behind the sun. Cd we

have natl systems, internationally managed. That wd. go a long

way to meet R. I.e. internatl inspn only for verification.

Avoids much of espionage difficulty.
H. Diffy is tht. U.S. don’t yet accept our scientists’ view on this.
J.G. U.S. are even suggesting inspns of prepns as well as actual tests.
D.E. If Fr. say they won’t stop testing, what chance of R. agreeing to

3-Power Treaty.

[Exit J.G., E.H.
4. Kenya.
R.M. K.A.N.U. – plan for unitary state, with some s’guards minorities. But

no security for European lands.

K.A.D.U. – a federal system on Swiss model. Inept for Africa: but

2 principles of value: upper Chamber and…….

Advance likely on 2 points: upper Chamber; provincial authies with

effective powers. Second wd. be of value to Europeans.

Mboya is gaining strength: and Kenyatta is being undermined.

Growing fear of Kikuyu domination. Chance of a split.

No talk of independence date. Seems accepted tht. a long trial of

self-govt. is necessary.

Not much result for 3 wks’ work. May have more to say next wk.
[May have to put up develpmt. money for re-settlement of landless

Africans on European lands. Conference not worried by

economic problems.]
P.M. What is our objective?
R.M. Agreement on principles offering s’guards for minorities.

These work for split in K.A.N.U. Moderate element mght. accept

long period of self-government.
C.S. Does economy rest on genl. agriculture rather than big coffee & sisal

estates.
R.M. Africans do recognise latter as essential to economy. Their ambitions

are directed to African share in genl. farm-lands of Europeans.

If we cd. get agreement in principle on upper Chamber, independent

judiciary, constitutional s’guards for minorities etc., we wd. work

out a constitution implementg. those principles and hold further

conference on that.
P.M. Cd we get a picture of distribn between large estates and small farms.

This shd. be circulated to Cab. With indication of targets



Agreed. which Africans have in mind.
Agreed: memo. above.

also on what mght. emerge from conference.


5. Revaluation for Rating.
Ch.H. Remaining ques. Shd we de-rate in some areas? 10 show 10% or

more increase. Most are sea-side towns & cause is lower valun

of hotels etc. In industrial towns, it is due to industries not

doing well. If you do this, you shift burden back on to the other

categories whom valuers have relieved. In B’mouth e.g. industry

burden wd. go from 40 odd to 70 odd. Burden on industry

generally is to rise by 43%: and wide variations from area to

area. 120% in Derby, 104% in Bedford. We shd. increase

pressure for same concession to industry in particular towns –

tho’ no power.

Pledges were given – but when it was thought that general burden on

dwellings wd. rise. H.B. said Tuesday he wasn’t committed by

this to doing it now.
I.M. Are we pledged? In my view we shd. do this. We took power to do it.

I wd. accept ceiling of 12½%. Did H.B.’s words amount to a

pledge.
R.A.B. They are all Tory strongholds. Will look like politics. Only 8 areas.
D.E. Has turned out v. differently.

Who benefits? Shopkeeper, presumably: if h’holders remain the

same and 43% goes on industry. Is this good economics?
F.E. If we relieve h’holders in 8 areas, we weaken our power to w’stand

industry’s pressure for same treatment.


J.H. Agree. Bound to make it worse. We shall have greater political

trouble. H.B. doesn’t think he pledged us to this action.


E.M. Also from ship-bldg.
J.M. In Scotland industry’s burden will be up by 200%.
Ch.H. Also: the 4 leading areas have lowest rate poundage.
P.M. Wd be easier if the rates were higher in these places.
A.B. H.B. does not regard his statements as pledging us to this action.
P.M. Believe there will be trouble either way.

Wd like to reflect further.

P.M., R.A.B., Ch.H., I.M., J.H. to consider & recommend

a conclusion to Cabinet.



C.C. 21(62). 13th March, 1962.
1. Federation: Ministerial Responsibility. [Enter M.R.
P.M. For years past we have felt diffy of dealing with Fedn & its

constituent territories through two Dpts. in Whitehall. Has

increased weight of problem itself. Thrown unnecessary

strain on Cab. system.

Decided to transfer responsibility to a single Minister: viz., the

senior of the Secretaries of State. Tho’ vital importance, not

full-time: also must avoid sense of crisis. Decided with good

will of both D.S. and R.M.

Grateful to R.A.B. for stepping into the breach.

Thanks to D.S. and R.M. for past services.


R.A.B. Taking this as public duty. Can see no solution. Great intransigence:

impossible to swim v. tide of African nationalism. I fully

realise all the diffies.

Look for help of D.S. & R.M. Also shall need support from Cabinet.


D.S. Sound decision. Promise support.
R.M. So do I.
2. Valuation for Rating.
P.M. Held mtg. Concluded tht. lesser danger wd. be to refrain from making

exceptions for particular areas:-

a) Tho’, elsewhere, general average wd. be below 12½%, some

individual ratings wd. be higher.

b) In the 3 towns we wd. have invidious appearance. Our motives

might be misunderstood. Also hotels etc., wd. hate it as much

as householders liked it.

c) Poundage in these areas is low – well below national average.


3. Building Licensing. [Enter J.H.
S.Ll. In 1956 and 1957 my predecessors decided against re-introduction.

Now, there is further reason. Bldg. industry is becoming more

efficient. In these circs. this wd. be wrong approach: & wd.

produce bad effect on industry’s co-operation e.g. with N.E.D.C.

Ready to consider other methods of easing pressure in particular areas.
Ch.H. This stemmed from my pressure for more resources for slum-

clearance. I was impressed by our load on industry – with 20%

increase in cost & 15 mos. for completion of council houses.

Was ready therefore to consider control.

But since then i) Ty. have agreed on means of startg. on my p’mme

with chance of completion. ii) M/W. has produced statistical

reasons for belief that load on industry will be relieved.
M. Re-introdn wd. be a mistake. M/W. forecast is likely to be right.
J.H. New orders are dropping off. If present trend continues, industry will

be under-employed in ’63.


D.S. Overwhelming case wd. be needed to warrant re-introdn of this

complex control.


J.H. Sitn in certain areas is bad. Some action will be needed. But no case

for general control.


R.A.B. x/ We need in reserve State authority to influence economy. I cdn’t

have done w’out them in 1951. No sufft case now: but believe

we shd. arm ourselves with this power in future. Also powers

over monopolies.


S.Ll. Evidence tht. in some areas bldg. industry is behaving like motor

industry in poaching labour. Bids up wages.


H.B. Hope we can devise means of local control of office bldg. We need

to spread this more.


P.M. Worried about x/. After 6 years of war and 6 more [Enter E.H.

of Socialism, pendulum swing to economic liberalism. Believe

it may have swung too far, from angle of Tory image. Diffy is

tht. in our recent crises the only weapons we have had are not

selective. Tho’ reconciled to not imposing bldg. controls now,

y/ I’m not impressed with social merit of present balance in bldg.

In 1951 we were able to use bldg. controls, & import controls:

and we are left w’out economic regulators which we need. We

need to have them in reserve – if not this one, study import

controls. Monetary methods alone are v. blunt instruments –

esp. when we need to contract in some areas only.

Problem for Ty: how can you operate v. particular areas w’out

affecting the country as a whole.
R.A.B. Reserve powers shd. be studied – on bldg., imports, monopolies

control.
Agreed: no introdn of bldg. controls now.

consider x and y/. Prs. group of Ministers.
4. Leonardo’s Cartoon: R. Academy.
H.B. R.A. have invited Govt. to buy at a large figure. With Ty. consent

P.M. declined. They were not surprised. They decided to go

on with sale, by auction. Press have now wormed this out of

them.


Possible courses. i) nothing ii) offer subsidy to R.A. – but they say

they don’t want it. iii) offer Govt. contn to a national fund to

buy the picture at auction.

Let public opinion develop before deciding on iii) – the most likely

course.

P.Q.’s for 22/3. This gives us time.



Sir C. Wheeler thinks it will be bought in this country.

Agree we shdn’t encourage public appeal. But can’t we give time

for this to happen spontaneously.
5. Foreign Affairs.
a) Berlin.

E.H. R. are dropping Window & also flying at 7.000-10.000 ft. (?).

N. has authority to fly above 10.000.
P.T. Show our confidence in N.
E.H. b) Congo.

A. & T. are mtg. 15/3. Wait.


c) Indonesia.

No agreemt. on substance – tho’ near on procedure.


d) Burma.

Have recognised new regime.


e) Haiti.

W’drawn Ambassadors on both sides.


f) Disarmament.

Opening moves at Geneva. Not promising.


6. Germany: Support Costs.
H.B. When P.M. saw A. in Jan. he offered 50% of f. exchange cost

(£73 m. p.a. or 800 m. D.M.) for 2 years in arms purchases.

My negotiations – G. cdn’t reach that figure – I argued tht. it cd.

not be limited to 2 yrs. Returned last week: they offered

£45 m. p.a. or 500 m. D.M. I said this wasn’t enough – tho’

indicated we mght. accept 600 m. D.M. – reportg. to N.A.T.O.

our view tht. this was most G. cd. be expected to do. Dr A.

said he wd. like to increase beyond 500. Their trouble is

over-commitment to U.S. arms.

They do want to help. And we shall get substantial relief fr. them

over next 2 years.

C.C. 22(62). 20th March, 1962.
1. Disarmament. [Enter M.R.
P.M. Conference not going well. May turn on “verification”.

Nuclear tests. Idea tht. national systems of detection may suffice –

Penney etc., in W’ton: looks as tho’ U.S./U.K. concln may

be tht. this will be so but is not so yet. Instruments patchy

between 500 & 1000 miles distance. Even so, however, there

wd. have to be some internatl inspn.

Can we avoid argument about this: and get R. down to ques. – are

they refusing to have any kind of verification. May have to get

this up to K.
2. Economic Survey.
S.Ll. Hope this may be the last – float it off to N.E.D.C.

Angled to small audience, financial journalists.

Been thro’ E.P.C. Not quite right yet.
P.M. Part II is dangerous surely.
S.Ll. Contains little that wasn’t said y’day.
P.M. Can’t say we predict 4% increase in production.
D.E. Para. 3-8: an account of unsuccessful management of economy.

An indictment on ourselves. Why not begin at para. 9?


S.Ll. Shortens Budget speech.
P.M. Perhaps L. President will do Part I into English?
Hail. No.
P.T. If we have to publish (I hope for last time) it will have to issue in much

this form.


M. Final para. shd. be adjusted, as E.P.C. contemplated – esp. omission of

word “particularly”.


H.B. Accurately summarises what we said in debate y’day.
P.M. Have another go at Pt. I. Delete paras 1-2. Include (e.g. in para. 17)

refce to appln to join E.E.C.

Minor amendments to be sent to S.Ll.

[Enter C., J.P., J.A.

3. Security in Public Service.
P.M. As in brief.

Presentation 27th March, with short statement in both Houses.

Satisfactory outcome qua M.I.6.

Opposition leaders may be willing to avoid debate esp. on M.I.6.


I.M. Better to p’pone publn for another week – 3 or 4 April. Tuesday 3/4.
D.S. O. Secrets Act useless in reln to r. & d. Ch. Pincher. Can’t be

prevented from publishing it.


E.H. Unfortunate from this angle tht. Pt. III is to be published.
P.M. Pincher is embarrassment rather than risk.

Disclosure of operations is more serious.


P.M. Let Security Cttee consider this general problem.

Let any Minister who wants to do so put in a memo. (Min. Cttee).


E.H. Communist penetration of C.S. Unions. Hope H.B. will consider

means of alerting membership. Agree can’t publish this chapter.


4. Kenya.
R.M. In view of disagreement – i) no demand for independence date

ii) willingness to accept a lead from U.K. Govt.

Wish now to outline to Conference a constitn on lines suggd in memo,

linked with idea of Coalition Govt. Means bringing Kenyatta

in, tho’ offl. wd. be head of Govt.

Br. troops wd. remain until at least independence. Algerian

settlement may help to get this (established or) agreed.
K. Para. 15 seems to be crux. No new constitution at once?
R.M. No.
Hail. If last sentence of 7 is correct, why put him in Govt? [Exit P.T.
R.M. W’out coalition Govt. you will encourage extremists in K.A.N.U.
Hail. Cdn’t you get Coalition without K.A.N.U.
R.M. No: Kikuyu are 37% and K. is their leader.

But his mental powers, & his influence, are declining.


Hail. You will never be able to say he is unfit for office, if you have put

him into office yourself. Looks unprincipled.


R.M. Mboya can’t break with Kenyatta yet.

K.A.D.U. wd. accept coalition under official Minister.

If K.A.N.U. reject proposal for coalition, this will drive wedge

between moderates & extremists in it.

C.S. Earlier expectations of Kenyatta going off have not been fulfilled.
Hail. Believe he is a formidable political figure. If we are beaten, and

he emerges – we can’t help it. Another matter to put him

in posn of responsibility ourselves.
P.M. i) Are we ready to compensate smaller farmers to get them out.

ii) Are we ready to w’hold independence thro’ life of this Parlt.

iii) Are we going to keep troops in Kenya until then?

Study what France has bn. able to keep in Algeria. (F.O.)

What is our image of the ultimate solution?
H.B. Cost of i) – taking account of inefficiency of African farmer.
J.P. We can leave troops there: but prob. need is for re-inforcement. And

our plans assumed disappearance of this commitment by ’63.

Mght. need to revise ideas of size of Army.
P.M. No: we wd. take Brigade out of B.A.O.R. – as France has done for

7 yrs.
Hail. Since ’45 coalitions have all led to dictatorship.


E.H. ? Italy: W. Germany.
H.B. Support R.M.’s plan.
D.S. Prefer to play for refusal of coalition offer.
R.M. If they accept it, they will try to make it work. If K.A.N.U. reject it,

the party will split.



C.C. 23 (62) 22nd March, 1962
1. Parliament. [Enter M.R., Dundee
I.M. Business for next week.
2. Disarmament.


    1. Nuclear Test.

P.M. Geneva: atmosphere better than usual. Presence of ignorant neutrals has bn. quite helpful – probing ques. addressed to Gromyko.

Washington: Penney/Zuckerman visit. Disappointing. Had hoped we cd. agree tht. national detection wd. suffice to identify suspicious events.
Insufft. evce: one single experiment only: U.S. research into seismology has bn. mis-directed. But H.’s last speech cd. at least ask R. to say wtr. they were willing to accept any type of verification. [There must be some independent check on suspicious incidents: but less objectionable if there were no static posts on Soviet soil.] R. has suggested small cttee: but they have taken definite stand tht. no foreigner shall ever enter R. for any purpose of inspn. If that is final, there can be no verification. But at least our public position will be easier. Probable explanation: tht. R. are ready for another series & want U.S. series to take place as an excuse. Doubt if any purpose in another appeal to K. Shall prob. have to say U.S. series now inevitable. Plenary discn on this on Fri. or Mon. No approach to K. until after that.


    1. General.

Cttee to be appointed to ascertain common ground & identify problems.

R. posn on verification – only on destruction.
R.A.B. Need to present this disappointing outcome to U.K. public in such a way as to make it plain that we have done our best.
D.S. U.S. & we have previously said willing to have ban on atmosph. tests.

x| Shd we not revive that. Hazards to health wd. at least be

covered. Better for us if R. rejected that also.
P.M. We cd. at least recall tht. we offered that & R. rejected it.

Shd I make independent effort to resolve deadlock by offering to meet K. myself. I hv. accepted that U.K. wd. have to join in.


D. Important tht. K. himself shd. be seen to be in support of Gromyko’s posn.
P.M. May be better to have Summit on Berlin, where there is some scope for negotiation. Also dangers of that situation are more imminent.

On balance on tests alone I wd. sooner make joint appeal to K. rather than suggest a Mtg.

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