15 January 2004 (extract from transcript, pages 30823 – 30939)




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CASE IT-02-54

PROSECUTOR vs. SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ

WITNESS NAME: Ante Marković

15 January 2004

(extract from transcript, pages 30823 – 30939)

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 WITNESS: ANTE MARKOVIC [Resumed]

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Markovic, thank you for returning to continue your

9 evidence. There's no need, of course, to take any formal oath or anything

10 of that sort. You took one earlier. There are three hours left of

11 cross-examination of the accused. We will, of course, have the usual

12 breaks. If at any time you would like to have a brief, do say so, a brief

13 pause, of course just mention it, but we would normally have the first

14 break in about an hour and a half.

15 There will be three hours, as I say, ordered for his

16 cross-examination. There will then be, I trust fairly limited, some

17 questions from the amicus and also from the Prosecution, but we have, we

18 understood, to take this position, that one way or another the evidence

19 will finish today.

20 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something, please? Is it

22 permissible or customary? I owe you an answer to your question and your

23 request regarding where and with whom and how Mr. Milosevic established

24 control over individual people and thus changed their opinion.

25 I thought this question over, though I don't have any original

1 documents with me, but on the basis of my notes and my own memories, I

2 remembered certain instances which I wish to convey to you.

3 The first case is that of Mr. Ivan Stambolic. When the time came

4 for Mr. Ivan Stambolic to be re-elected to his position, Mr. Milosevic

5 spoke to me to the effect that Stambolic should not be proposed for

6 re-election. I discussed the matter with my associates in the government

7 who were from Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the first place with Aco Mitrovic and

8 with Gacic as well. Both of them were of the opinion that Ivan Stambolic

9 was doing so well in his new position that people in the economy,

10 businessmen, have a lot of respect for him and felt that he was doing a

11 very good job.

12 After Mr. Milosevic had spoken to these people and sent a letter

13 to the Federal Executive Council, that is the government, saying that Ivan

14 Stambolic should not be re-elected and that Serbia did not agree with such

15 a suggestion - and this letter was signed by Mr. Milosevic - then both

16 these gentlemen changed their opinion, and both of them started persuading

17 me that we should not allow Ivan Stambolic to be re-elected general

18 manager of the Yugoslav Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In spite

19 of this and in spite of the pressure they made and despite the fact that

20 Ivan Gacic was the person who, at the 8th session of the Central Committee

21 of the League of Communists of Serbia had supported Ivan Stambolic and as

22 a result has lost his position as Secretary-General of the League of

23 Communists of Yugoslavia, regardless, therefore, of the fact that he was a

24 very close friend and associate of Ivan Stambolic, he felt that he should

25 vote against his re-election to the position of general manager of the

1 Yugoslav Bank for International Economic Cooperation.

2 These are the examples that I could recollect. There are others,

3 but perhaps not so convincing that I would be able to explain for you.

4 There's something else that I wanted to add.

5 Mr. Milosevic, as he himself said, came with some old documents

6 from my former office which say and which testify to all the things that I

7 had done during the three years that I was in Belgrade, and he said with

8 satisfaction, "Where did we meet? Let Mr. Markovic tell us." I looked

9 through my notes, and fortunately I managed to find a note saying that we

10 did meet when I had said. I said that it was three or four weeks prior to

11 my departure from Belgrade. I left Belgrade on the 21st of December, and

12 the meeting with Milosevic was on the 21st of November. So that is quite

13 in conformity with what I had said, three or four weeks.

14 Something else that I managed to establish was that there had been

15 another meeting prior to that, that is about a month prior to this

16 meeting, and it had to do with the bombing of the Banski Dvori where

17 Mr. Tudjman, Mesic, and I were. I forgot to mention this in the

18 investigation or in the interview. Mr. Milosevic can check this out as he

19 has the documents. I don't have them. It doesn't say what we discussed,

20 but at least it says when it is that we met.

21 Thank you.

22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. May. I hope that the

24 time used by Mr. Markovic for his explanations will be subtracted from the

25 time planned for me.

1 JUDGE MAY: Your time begins now. So let us get on with it.

2 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

3 Q. [Interpretation] I must say, however, that this fact about a

4 meeting between you and me on the 21st of November, you didn't see that in

5 the review of your duties but that you found this in some notes you had.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So in the review of your duties, in the schedule, this meeting is

8 not mentioned.

9 A. Please look and see whether this meeting took place in November.

10 Q. This was the year 1991, and this is a schedule of your

11 obligations. I don't have that on me any more. I've handed it over.

12 Unfortunately, I didn't make a photocopy, but that doesn't change things.

13 It is quite clear that towards the end of the year, we did not meet.

14 A. It is quite clear that we did meet, and this can be checked from

15 that document. I don't know. The Court has it or the Prosecutor. That

16 can easily be verified that this meeting took place in my office on the

17 21st of November, which is four weeks prior to my departure from Belgrade.

18 Q. Very well. Did you come to see me or did I come to see you?

19 A. No, no. I came to see you, and I think I stayed for about two and

20 a half to three hours.

21 Q. Very well. But that again is different from what you said before,

22 because you say -- you've said that you had come to see me prior to your

23 departure. In fact, you now say it was a month prior to your departure?

24 A. I'm not changing my statement. In my statement I said that I came

25 to see you three or four weeks prior to leaving Belgrade.

1 Q. Very well. Let us continue where we broke off last time. In that

2 brief cross-examination, we covered the facts regarding your

3 responsibility for the war in Slovenia.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the stenographic notes that

5 we reviewed previously, that is the session of the 21st of August,

6 beginning at 11.00 in 1991, the first page ends with 082, ERN number 082.

7 I received it from the opposite side, and these stenographic notes clearly

8 show Mr. Markovic's responsibilities for the war in Slovenia, and could it

9 be tendered into evidence, please?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say anything in that

11 connection?

12 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Let's get this document. We'll find

13 it.

14 Mr. Nice, perhaps you can assist us on that matter. It doesn't



15 appear to have been a document provided already. Yes. We'll get a copy

16 from the accused and see what it is.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't give you this copy now.

18 This is the copy that I received from the opposite side. You can get it

19 from them, because I wanted to refer to it again in continuation of my

20 cross-examination with reference to the war in Slovenia.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

22 MR. NICE: I may not be able to provide it immediately. I will do

23 my best --

24 JUDGE MAY: Give us the date again, Mr. Milosevic, and give us the

25 details of it.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is a session of the Presidency,

2 which was expanded in composition, attended by us from the republics, held

3 on the 21st of August, 1991, and these are stenographic notes, and the

4 first page has the ERN number 00526082. That is the first page, the ERN

5 on the first page. And the last page ends with numbers 204. That is the

6 document that we reviewed last time.

7 I wish to remind you that on the page with the number 244 of these

8 minutes, 00526137, the president of Slovenia at the time, Milan Kucan,

9 says in response to Mr. Markovic: "I don't need to persuade you that you

10 will not find anyone in Slovenia, including these two, that is members of

11 the federal government who will return to the Federal Executive Council

12 and work there." SIV, S-I-V, which means the Federal Executive Council.

13 It is a SIV which is known in Slovenia to have started the war in

14 Slovenia.

15 So that is what we quoted. And why, in addition to other excerpts

16 that I don't have time to go into now because we covered them, but this is

17 the reason why I wish to tender this document into evidence as an exhibit.

18 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let's deal with one thing at a time.

19 Let's deal with the Prosecution. Do you think you can find that in the

20 meantime?

21 MR. NICE: We can certainly find it. It won't take very long, and

22 we'll make it available and have it produced.

23 JUDGE MAY: Clearly, if you're going to ask Mr. Markovic any

24 questions, he must have the opportunity of seeing what the document is.

25 Now, the most sensible course - and it may be well that it will be

1 exhibited - the most sensible course may well be to find this document.

2 JUDGE KWON: I find some page numbers the accused referred to are

3 matching with the page numbers of Exhibit 427, tab 6, but if the

4 Prosecution can check it later.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will do that, and it may well be that we will

6 admit it, but we need first of all to check it.

7 Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 Yes, Mr. Markovic. If you want to add something, you can.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In any event, Mr. Milosevic

10 extracted a segment from the evolution of relations. Relations from the

11 beginning when I joined the federal government between Slovenia and

12 Serbia, or Serbia and Slovenia, and also between Milosevic and Kucan were

13 extremely tense. In the final analysis, Serbia blocked all goods that

14 were due to come from Bosnia to Serbia long before the war. All economic

15 relations were suspended.

16 Serbia also organised - and that means Milosevic - the visit of a

17 large group of people, most of them highly radical, to go to Bosnia and to

18 organise a rally there, a popular rally, and Slovenia prevented this.

19 There was constant conflict over the problem of Kosovo and what

20 was going on in Kosovo, so that in that context, if you review events and

21 the war in Slovenia, it becomes quite clear that this was only a marginal

22 aspect of what had happened until then as well as what happened after that

23 when the decision was taken to pull out the army from Slovenia, and who

24 took that decision and who immediately agreed with that decision prior to

25 that. And it is absolutely not true that the Federal Executive Council

1 took such a decision. I'm speaking from memory as I don't have the

2 document now. It says clearly that the federal Secretariat for Internal

3 Affairs would organise supervision over those facilities in Slovenia which

4 were in their possession and that to do so they would use units which the

5 army has deployed along the border, border units.

6 The soldiers that were in Slovenia in the so-called Slovenian war,

7 were not in the border barracks but soldiers that came out of their

8 barracks with tanks and cannon. Therefore, someone else had taken the

9 decision to use military force to pull them out of the barracks under full

10 military gear. Such a decision was not taken by the Federal Executive

11 Council nor could it have been taken by it, because if it could, then the

12 federal Presidency would not have tortured itself and had endless meetings

13 over the possibility of using the army. Such permission was never

14 granted. And that is why it was felt that the Presidency was incapable of

15 functioning in such a situation, and that is why efforts were made to

16 topple the Presidency, and even through me to disband that Presidency and

17 to use me to carry out a kind of state coup as proposed by Kadijevic.

18 So what Milosevic is now saying is not right, because when the

19 decision was to be taken to withdraw the army from Slovenia, that decision

20 was in fact taken by the army, Milosevic, and Kucan. The rest of us -- I

21 had no right to vote at the Presidency, but other members of the

22 Presidency were also extremely concerned over what was happening, and from

23 there the army was transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24 I have to make myself quite clear: I was against the withdrawal

25 of the army. I wanted it to continue to be dispersed throughout the

1 country because it would have less opportunity of committing aggression if

2 it is not concentrated in one place, but this was not in my hands. I

3 couldn't take any such decision. Nowhere is there any possibility

4 envisaged for the federal government to have command over the army. It

5 was only the Presidency that could do that. Who negotiated with Kadijevic

6 in the Presidency for the troops to come out of the barracks, I don't

7 know, but it was never officially reported anywhere.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Markovic, that is the whole point. Even the president of the

10 Presidency at the time, Jovic, was not aware of your intervention in

11 Slovenia. So what you're now telling us at great length, quite

12 unnecessarily, is absolutely untrue. And to prove that to you, I will

13 quote from you this same stenographic report. It is on page 247 of that

14 report. The last digits of the ERN number are 6140. And trying to

15 respond to accusations against you by Kucan and others and myself to the

16 effect that you had provoked the war in Slovenia, you even quote from your

17 own decision, and you say yourself: "The Federal Executive Council took a

18 decision on the implementation of federal regulations regarding the state

19 border in Slovenia," et cetera.

20 And then in the next paragraph, you say, and you quote from that

21 decision: "Immediate enforcement of federal regulations will be achieved

22 by the federal Ministry of the Interior in direct cooperation with the

23 federal Secretariat for National Defence so as to engage border units of

24 the JNA to secure the state border at border crossings and in inhabited

25 areas in the border belt."

1 So it was by your decision that you obliged your two federal

2 ministries, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National

3 Defence, to intervene in Slovenia. No one else knew about it, not even

4 the Presidency of the SFRY.

5 A. That is not so. You read out correctly this segment. The police

6 of Yugoslavia was meant to get the cooperation of border units, those

7 protecting the border and who do not have tanks or cannon but only light

8 weapons, and to carry this out in cooperation with them.

9 In the first place, that was not done. Neither the police nor the

10 border units took part, but those that did take part were tanks and cannon

11 and units that came out of the garrison. There were even units that came

12 from Croatia. There were units from Istria, units from the surroundings

13 of Zagreb. Therefore, someone had taken that decision. These were not

14 border units but military units from several garrisons. We know that even

15 some generals had problems afterwards because they had taken people along

16 a 200-kilometre-long journey to reach Slovenia. No one else could have

17 taken such a decision except the person who had the army under full

18 control. And it was you, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, that had full control of

19 the army.

20 Q. That is not right, Mr. Ante Markovic. You were the federal Prime

21 Minister. You had the army under your control. And as for communication

22 with the military leadership, in your schedule of responsibilities you can

23 see how many times you met with the military or police leadership in the

24 course of 1991 and how you acted as the most responsible person, as the

25 president of the federal government of SFRY.

1 And as regards what you said about my especially tense

2 relationship --

3 JUDGE MAY: The witness must have the occasion to answer,

4 particularly important points which are made. The witness must have the

5 answer -- chance to answer the allegations.

6 Mr. Markovic, you've heard what the accused alleges. Perhaps you

7 would care to respond, however briefly.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I do not have all the

9 documents that Mr. Milosevic has, and I am completely in an inferior

10 position because I was unable to get anything from my office whereas he

11 got everything. However, certain things are abundantly clear.

12 If the government had been able to make decisions on how to use

13 the army, then it would have been unnecessary to hold multiple sessions of

14 the Presidency of Yugoslavia and take votes on using the army to calm the

15 situation down in Yugoslavia. The Presidency discussed umpteen times, as

16 well as at the closed sessions of the joint staff, this issue, and if the

17 government had been able to decide on this, nobody would have bothered

18 with the Presidency. So this is a blatant lie.

19 We didn't stand a chance in all this affair. We had no

20 communications with the army. If there had been communication between the

21 government and the army and General Kadijevic who was in charge of the

22 army and as such was accountable to the government, but in actual fact, he

23 as a commander was completely subjected to the Presidency. The Federal

24 Executive Council had nothing to do with it.

25 I repeat, you can take original documents and read them. The only

1 function according to which the army, or in this case General Kadijevic

2 were a member of the army, were in terms of finance and administration.

3 The federal government had no other competence over the army.

4 And I would like to say once again, as far as Slovenia is

5 concerned, units from garrisons with cannons, tanks, and other equipment

6 were used, even units from the environs of Zagreb and from Croatia were

7 used. And the phrasing in the decision of the federal government was that

8 units that were already stationed on the border crossings should be used

9 in cooperation with the police using only light weapons. But none of this

10 was implemented. What was effected was an invasion. Who could have

11 allowed this -- built this?

12 In March 1990 when a huge number of people came out into the

13 streets of Belgrade, over 100.000, to demonstrate against Mr. Milosevic,

14 somebody decided to bring out tanks to stop them. Who was able to

15 sanction this? Everything was done as it was done.

16 Of course, formally Mr. Milosevic did not take this decision, but

17 in actual fact he did. He was behind that, and he was behind what

18 happened in Sarajevo.

19 JUDGE MAY: Just help us with this so we can follow and make sure

20 it's clear, and if you could keep the answers short, please.

21 Did you have any control at all over the army?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, none.

23 JUDGE MAY: Did you have direct -- any communication with the

24 army?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did. I said, in

1 administrative terms and financial terms, I did have contact with the

2 army. Everything else was under the command of the Presidency of

3 Yugoslavia.

4 JUDGE MAY: Were you in a position to get the army to do anything

5 or to ask them to do anything? Were they prepared to do it? Did you have

6 any control over them at all.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No. So help me God, no.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Markovic, what you're saying, is -- would

9 that be confirmed by the constitutional system?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Completely in accordance, in

11 conformity with the constitutional system. Anyway, it's very logical.

12 The army was financed from the budget of Yugoslavia. The budget of

13 Yugoslavia was under the control of the Federal Executive Council.

14 One item of this budget related to the army, and that was

15 practically the only communication between the army and the federal

16 government. There was no command or control communication, no information

17 as to where units were deployed was given to the government, because that

18 was not within our purview. Specialised functions of the army came under

19 the exclusive competence of the Presidency, and the Presidency held many,

20 many sessions to decide where and how the army would be used. All, all of

21 them.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Well, Mr. Markovic, that is precisely the point. It is not in

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1 dispute that under the constitution only the Presidency of Yugoslavia has

2 the right to command the army, but in the instance of the war in Slovenia,

3 which Kucan himself says was caused by the Federal Executive Council, it

4 is obvious that you had abused and usurped the function of the Prime

5 Minister of Yugoslavia, bypassing the constitution, because you are

6 quoting your own decision in this shorthand notes when you say that: "In

7 the implementation of this decision, the Federal Executive Council will

8 immediately cooperate, directly cooperate with the federal Ministry for

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